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THE RIGHT OF JURY NULLIFICATION 
IN RECONSTRUCTION-ERA ORIGINALISM:  
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF JUDICIAL PREDECENT 
Jonathan Bressler
 
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court, invoking antebellum judicial precedent, held that 
juries no longer have the right to “nullify,” that is, to refuse to apply the law. Today, however, 
in determining the substance of the constitutional criminal procedure right of trial by jury, the 
Supreme Court emphasizes originalism, assessing the right’s current boundaries by the 
Founding-era understanding of it. Relying on the Supreme Court’s originalist jurisprudence, 
scholars and several federal judges have recently concluded that because Founding-era juries 
had the right to nullify, the right was beyond the authority of nineteenth-century judges to 
curtail, and that, under the current originalist regime, it should be restored. Yet originalists 
who advocate restoration of the right to nullify are missing an important constitutional 
moment: Reconstruction. The Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally transformed constitutional 
criminal procedure by incorporating rights against the states and by providing a federally 
guaranteed civil right to protection that altered the relationship between the federal 
government and localities and between federal judges and local juries. Reconstruction-era 
history thus illuminates a new original understanding of constitutional criminal procedure 
rights today. 
This paper analyzes Reconstruction-era judicial practices, legal treatises, dictionaries, 
Congressional debates, and Congressional legislation to provide an account of how the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s framers, ratifiers, original interpreters, and original enforcers 
understood the “new” Constitution and their amendment to affect jury nullification. It finds 
that the Reconstruction Congresses understood the Fourteenth Amendment not to incorporate 
the jury’s right to nullify against the states, even as it incorporated a general right to jury trial 
and due process. On the contrary, the Reconstruction Republicans understood jury nullification 
to be incompatible with the constitutional rights to life, liberty, property, and security that they 
were charged with protecting in the former Confederate states and in the Utah Territory. In 
what was then among the most significant revolutions in federal jury law, the Reconstruction 
Republicans, understanding the Constitution to authorize them even to disallow jury 
nullification in at least some types of federal cases, supported legislation that would purge in 
mass from criminal juries Southern and Mormon would-be nullifiers, even some prospective 
jurors who plausibly believed that a federal criminal statute was unconstitutional. 
Therefore, the Reconstruction Congresses, through the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
enforcement legislation, may have superdemocratically constitutionalized the nineteenth-
century judicial precedent that had disallowed the jury’s right to nullify. There may be, in other 
words, an originalist basis, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and history, for the 
shift away from the right to nullify. While no single account may definitively capture “original 
meaning,” Reconstruction-era history provides a new original understanding of a dilemma in 
contemporary constitutional criminal procedure. 
   Many thanks to my instructors Professors Akhil Reed Amar, Morton Horwitz, Michael McCon-
nell, Jed Shugerman, and David Alan Sklansky for their guidance and advice in developing this paper, 
and to the participants in the Harvard Law School Legal History Workshop for helpful feedback and 
comments.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
nly one right is guaranteed in both the body of the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights,1 and only one was guaranteed in all twelve state consti-
tution drafted before 1787:2 the right of trial by jury in criminal cases. After 
all, as Alexander Hamilton asserted, “The friends and adversaries of the 
plan of the [Constitutional C]onvention, if they agree in nothing else, concur 
at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury.”3 Yet, in spite of its im-
portance,4 the constitutional text guarantees little more than trial by “jury.” 
While the term “jury” must have substance for the right to criminal trial to 
have meaning, there are no statements in Article III or the Sixth Amendment 
about what jury actually means or what jury trial actually requires.5 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that it must “give intelligible 
content to the right of jury trial.”6 The Court, however, has had trouble de-
termining whether to mandate, for example, twelve-person juries or unani-
mous verdicts,7 and its decisions have often seemed arbitrary.8 
O 
Forty years ago, in deciding what the Constitution’s criminal jury provi-
sions entail, the Court cared little about what the constitutional text was 
originally understood to protect. “We do not pretend,” the Court once re-
marked, “to be able to divine precisely what the word ‘jury’ imported to the 
framers, the First Congress, or the States in 1789.”9 Recently, however, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  1  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall 
be by Jury . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
  2  See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United 
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870 (1994); see also Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury 
Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 421–26 (2009) (describing the state constitutions). 
  3 T HE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
  4  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 161 
(1997) (“No idea was more central to our Bill of Rights—indeed, to America’s distinctive regime of gov-
ernment of the people, by the people, and for the people—than the idea of the jury.”). 
  5  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 241 (2005) (noting that 
jurors “could point to no strong statements in the constitutional text” that define their role). 
  6  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004). 
  7  Compare Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (holding state convictions on 10–2 verdicts did 
not violate the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments), Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (holding 
that state convictions on 9–3 verdicts did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment), and Williams v. Flor-
ida, 399 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1970) (calling the right to a jury of twelve “a historical accident” unprotected 
by the Sixth Amendment), with Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (stating that a consti-
tutional trial by jury “means a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes all 
the elements as they were recognized in this country and England when the Constitution was adopted,” 
including a jury of twelve and unanimous verdicts), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898) 
(stating that “the jury referred to in the original constitution and in the sixth amendment is a jury consti-
tuted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither more nor less”). 
  8  Compare Williams, 399 U.S. 78 (upholding a criminal conviction by a unanimous jury of six), with 
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (holding that a criminal conviction on 5–1 vote violated the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments), and Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (holding that a criminal 
conviction by a unanimous jury of five violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
  9  Williams, 399 U.S. at 98.  
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Court has emphasized the significance of originalism in contemporary con-
stitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence.10 For stage after stage of 
criminal trial—from evidence11 to verdict12 to sentencing13—the Court has 
analyzed Founding-era history to determine the original meaning and thus 
the constitutional requirements of criminal jury trial.14 In other words, the 
Court has found that “jury” has substantive content that was implicit in the 
original text and must be enforced today.15 Statutes enhancing criminal pun-
ishment based on facts determined by a judge, rather than a jury, for exam-
ple, have been held to violate the Constitution’s substantive right of trial by 
jury,16 though the Constitution, of course, lacks explicit statements con-
demning these statutes as unconstitutional. 
Notwithstanding its ubiquity in modern criminal jury law, the Court’s 
originalism has failed to penetrate two important realms. Substantively, the 
Court has missed one criminal jury trial right that the Founding-era framers 
considered among the most important. This was the jury’s right to decide 
questions of law, and thus to reject the law as given to it by the court, an 
idea most often identified today as the jury’s right to nullify the law.17 
While Founding-era jury nullification doctrine held that the jury’s right to 
nullify was essential to protect rights from an overbearing government, 
modern jury nullification doctrine, on the other hand, holds that jury nullifi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  10  See Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of 
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 185 (2005) (“Original-
ism, in short, is a powerful force in criminal procedure . . . .”); Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Require-
ments in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1516 (2006) (noting that originalism 
has “figured prominently” in recent constitutional criminal procedure cases); Antonin Scalia, Foreword, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 871, 871 (2008) (“Originalism is in the game, even if it does not always 
prevail.  Sometimes . . . it does prevail, as in [recent constitutional criminal procedure cases].”). 
  11  See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
  12  See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995). 
  13  See Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
  14  See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008) (“[Crawford] ‘turn[ed] to the historical 
background of the [Confrontation] Clause to understand its meaning,’ and relied primarily on legal de-
velopments that had occurred prior to the adoption of the Sixth Amendment to derive the correct inter-
pretation.” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43)); 
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306 (noting that without the sentencing restrictions required by Apprendi, “the 
jury would not exercise the control that the Framers intended”). 
  15  See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court’s sen-
tencing law decisions are motivated “by the need to preserve Sixth Amendment substance”); see also 
Bertrall L. Ross II, Reconciling the Booker Conflict: A Substantive Sixth Amendment in a Real Offense 
Sentencing System, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 725, 728 (2006) (noting that “the jury has a 
constitutionally protected substantive role to play in checking government power.”). 
  16  See Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27, 244; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 305, 313; Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584, 592–93 (2002); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
  17  See CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 6 (1998). Although 
nullification is conventionally defined as a “jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or 
refusal to apply the law,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (8th ed. 2004), the concept has been expended 
to include single holdout jurors who “choose not to follow the law as it is given to them by the judge,” 
Nancy S. Marden, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 881 (1999).  
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cation is nothing more than an illegitimate power.18 Because the modern 
doctrine is inconsistent with the Court’s Sixth Amendment originalism, 
scholars, attorneys, and even federal judges have called for abrogating Su-
preme Court precedent and restoring the jury’s right to nullify.19 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Yet, this call for Founding-era originalism overlooks the other realm that 
the Court’s originalism has ignored. Temporally, the Court and most of its 
originalist commentators have neglected a constitutional moment that, as-
suming an originalist or a textualist perspective, should shine significant 
light on contemporary criminal procedure rights, including the right to nul-
lify.20 This was the creation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the textual hook 
through which the Court refracts most modern criminal procedure doctrine, 
including all state issues. Fundamentally revolutionizing the nature of fed-
eralism and civil rights, the Fourteenth Amendment transformed them from 
a Founding-era constitutional paradigm of individual, locality, and state 
rights against liberty-endangering federal power to a Reconstruction-era 
constitutional paradigm of individual rights and liberty-enhancing federal 
power against locality and state rights. In establishing and prioritizing na-
tionalist-oriented federalism and civil rights, therefore, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was understood to transform or to curtail certain older constitu-
tional principles and rights that conflicted with the new ones. 
In the criminal procedure context, against the implicit Sixth Amendment 
right of jury nullification, which had been another Founding-era bastion of 
individual defendants’ and local juries’ rights against the federal govern-
ment, arose the Fourteenth Amendment civil right to protection by the state 
and federal governments of life, liberty, property, and security against de-
fendants’, nullifying juries’, and states’ deprivations of that right.21 As a re-
sult, the Fourteenth Amendment altered the Sixth Amendment jury trial 
right’s scope and meaning. Incorporation doctrine makes clear that some 
type of Reconstruction-era revision occurred with respect to state cases, but 
the constitutional revision may also apply to federal cases, where federally 
enforced Fourteenth Amendment civil rights may have superseded implicit 
or penumbral Sixth Amendment jury rights that existed at the Founding. In 
revising constitutional criminal procedure, the new Reconstruction-era civil 
right to federal and state protection of individual life, liberty, property, and 
security may have trumped certain Founding-era constitutional criminal 
procedure rights, like the jury’s right to nullify. 
Although the Court and its commentators have focused on the Sixth 
Amendment’s Founding-era history, both have largely ignored the Recon-
struction-era history that explains the original understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s criminal procedure protections and thus how the Four-
  18  See infra notes 28–43, 53–81 and accompanying text. 
  19  See infra Section II.A. 
  20  See infra Section II.C. 
  21  See infra Section IV.A.  
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teenth Amendment may have transformed constitutional criminal procedure. 
Even Professor Akhil Reed Amar, the leading scholar who explains the Re-
construction-era process through which new constitutional amendments 
may have “reglossed” the original Bill of Rights22 and who has discussed 
how Reconstruction may have affected the right to nullify,23 agrees with 
originalist scholars that today there is or should be some Founding-era con-
stitutional right to nullify.24 Yet, the Founding-era perspective misses how 
Reconstruction committed the United States to a new vision of courts and 
juries, a new role of civil rights, a new robust reading of Congressional 
power, and a new priority of nationalism over localism. In attempting to un-
derstand the original meaning of our post–Fourteenth Amendment Constitu-
tion, Founding-era originalists omit the legal history of an important era, 
one that illuminates a “new,” Reconstruction-era original meaning. 
This paper attempts to remedy these substantive and temporal omissions 
by assessing how the Reconstruction generation understood jury nullifica-
tion. While others have written about doctrinal, prudential, and structural 
arguments for or against the jury’s right to nullify,25 this paper focuses on 
the archetype of legal analysis that Philip Bobbitt calls “historical argu-
ment.”26 Its purpose is not to evaluate the merits or demerits either of 
originalism as an interpretive methodology or of jury nullification as a prac-
tice. Rather, its purpose is to offer a new way of understanding the issue of 
jury nullification through a different lens of originalism, the methodology 
that the Supreme Court has adopted in its recent jury law jurisprudence. 
This paper starts from the premise that the Court considers originalism 
highly relevant to the issue—after all, recent constitutional criminal proce-
dure opinions for the Court written by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and 
Ginsburg have relied upon substantial originalist analysis27—and then ana-
lyzes how incorporating Reconstruction-era history into that methodology 
may affect an originalist interpretation of the right to nullify. 
First, this paper concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers un-
derstood their amendment to guarantee the right of criminal jury trial in 
state courts but not to incorporate the jury’s historic right to nullify against 
the states. In 1868, unlike in 1791, this right was not considered inherent in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  22  E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 177 
(2008) (discussing the Reconstruction-era process that “reglossed” the Second Amendment). 
  23  See infra notes 166, 173 and accompanying text. 
  24  See infra notes 161–170 and accompanying text. 
  25  See, e.g., sources cited in SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 54–65 (8th ed. 2007).  
  26   See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7 (1982) (describing the five archetypes of constitu-
tional arguments: historical, textual, structural, prudential, and doctrinal). 
  27 For examples of the use of originalism in the majority opinions of recent constitutional criminal 
procedure cases, see Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 717–18 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.); Giles v. California, 128 
S. Ct. 2678, 2682–86 (2008) (Scalia, J.); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477–83 (Stevens, J.); Jones v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 227, 244–48 (1999) (Souter, J.).  
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due process or jury trial. Second, it shows that, contrary to the Sixth 
Amendment’s framers, the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers understood 
jury nullification to be inconsistent with constitutional rights because it pre-
vented the government from enforcing the right to protection contained in 
Section 1. While the Founding generation viewed jury nullification as an es-
sential guarantor of constitutional rights, the Reconstruction generation be-
lieved that nullifying juries were violating victims’ civil rights. Since the 
Reconstruction-era understanding of jury nullification was antithetical to the 
Founding-era understanding, the Fourteenth Amendment may have trans-
formed this substantive criminal jury right that had been implicit in the 
Sixth Amendment. According to the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers un-
derstanding, the Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement leg-
islation did or could empower Congress and federal courts to disallow nulli-
fication, at least with respect to certain crimes, if not in all cases. Ultimately, 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and history may provide an alternative 
justification of the Court’s current doctrine prohibiting the jury’s right to 
nullify, one that comports with originalism—Reconstruction-era original-
ism. More importantly, it illustrates that constitutional original meaning may 
not be captured exclusively in a Founding-era history of rights. 
  This paper proceeds in three principal parts. Part II discusses the con-
flicts in current nullification doctrine and explains this paper’s methodology. 
It begins with a descriptive conflict: although current doctrine prohibits nul-
lification, the Court has insisted upon originalism in constitutional criminal 
procedure and scholars have demonstrated that the Founding generation 
embraced the jury’s substantive right to nullify; therefore, several federal 
judges have taken this substantive contradiction to mean that current nullifi-
cation doctrine either should be or has been overruled. Part II also intro-
duces the normative conflict: current doctrine is based upon nineteenth-
century judicial precedent that defied the popular will of many antebellum 
state legislatures and may not be the type of authority that democratic con-
stitutional theory should desire. It then explains why Reconstruction-era 
originalism may provide a better textual and historical basis for determining 
current criminal procedure rights than Founding-era originalism does. It 
concludes by examining prior scholarship in the field and how Reconstruc-
tion-era sources, particularly Congressional bills and debates, may illumi-
nate an originalist understanding of the right of jury nullification. 
  Parts III and IV apply a Reconstruction-era originalist analysis of jury 
nullification. Part III addresses whether the Reconstruction generation un-
derstood the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the right of nullification 
against the states. It does so by assessing what the meaning of the right to 
jury trial in relation to nullification was in 1868 as understood through judi-
cial practices, treatises, and dictionaries and, most importantly, by offering 
the Reconstruction Congresses’ understanding of nullification as revealed in 
the floor debates from the Thirty-ninth through Forty-second Congresses. 
Part IV asks whether the Reconstruction generation understood the Consti-
tution disallow, or to authorize Congress to disallow, the jury’s right to nul- 
April 2009  RECONSTRUCTION AND JURY NULLIFICATION 8 
lify. It analyzes whether the Reconstruction Congresses, acting in the name 
of a federal right to protection, consciously understood nullification to be 
antithetical to freedmen’s rights in the Southern states and to women’s rights 
in the Utah Territory, and it provides case studies of proposed legislation in-
tending to purge jurors who were willing to nullify in federal criminal cases. 
Part V concludes that, under a Reconstruction-era originalist interpretation, 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s new original meaning did not incorporate the 
jury’s right to nullify, and it may have transformed the Sixth Amendment to 
disallow that right even in federal cases, suggesting that Founding-era 
originalism should not monopolize originalist constitutional interpretation. 
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE AND TEMPORAL OMISSIONS OF MODERN DOCTRINE 
Ever since the first Justice Harlan’s late-nineteenth-century opinion for 
the Supreme Court in Sparf v. United States28 held that “it is the duty of ju-
ries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the 
facts,”29 the law of the land has been that though juries may have the unau-
thorized power to nullify, they have no legal or moral right to do so, and 
courts have the authority to prevent it.30 Today, voir dire seeks to ensure 
that jurors selected for service will not nullify,31 jurors must take an oath to 
apply the law as instructed by the court,32 jurors may be instructed that they 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  28  156 U.S. 51 (1895). 
  29  Id. at 102. 
  30 The Supreme Court has not considered nullification at length since Sparf but has referred to it 
briefly. Compare Douglas D. Koski & Hui-Yu Lee, Jury Nullification in the United States of America: 
A Brief History and 21st Century Conception, in THE JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 322, 326 
(Douglas D. Koski ed., 2003) (“In Sparf and Hansen v. United States, the Supreme Court had its first 
and only say in the matter [of nullification].”), with United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63 (1984) 
(characterizing jury nullification as “the unreviewable power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for 
impermissible reasons”), Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (describing nullification as 
jurors’ “assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise” (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted)), and Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (characterizing the practice of 
jury nullification as the “assumption of a power” which a jury has “no right to exercise”). For examples 
of recent appellate decisions relying on Sparf, see United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 304 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“[W]e hold that the district courts may discharge a juror for . . . failure to follow the district 
court’s instructions, or jury nullification . . . .”); Merced v. McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“[W]hile jurors have the power to nullify a verdict, they have no right to do so.”); Smith v. Winters, 337 
F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that there is “no right” of “jury nullification”); see also Kadish et 
al., supra note 25, at 54 (“The federal courts and nearly all the states . . . refuse to permit instructions 
informing the jury of its nullification power.”); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JU-
RIES 227 (2007) (“[S]ince the late nineteenth century, American courts have consistently held that al-
though juries have the power to disregard the law . . . , they do not have the legal right to do so.”). 
  31  See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES § 2.06(8)(d), at 
93 (4th ed., rev. 2000) (including among its list of standard voir dire questions to prospective jurors: “If 
you are selected to sit on this case, will you be able to render a verdict solely on the evidence presented 
at the trial and in the context of the law as I will give it to you in my instructions, disregarding any other 
ideas, notions, or beliefs about the law that you may have encountered in reaching your verdict?”). 
  32  See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Nullification is, by definition, a 
violation of a juror’s oath to apply the law as instructed by the court . . . .”).  
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have a “duty” to convict if the evidence proves guilt,33 and trial judges have 
a “duty”34 to prevent nullification through instruction,35 admonition, and 
the removal of nullifying jurors, even during jury deliberations.36 In con-
trast to contemporary courts’ hostility toward nullification,37 however, 
Founding-era Americans embraced nullification and viewed jury interpreta-
tion of law as not merely a power but also an essential right. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
Whether jurors have the constitutional right or only the unauthorized 
power to nullify is an issue that affects the outcome of some criminal trials 
today. With only the power to nullify, jurors may still surreptitiously do so, 
but while prosecutors sometimes fear nullification, especially in cases in-
volving euthanasia or drugs, guns, and other possession offenses, most 
commentators agree that such instances of jury disobedience are rare.38 As 
an instance of televised jury deliberations showed, in a real criminal case 
where the judge permitted the defense attorney to argue for nullification but 
refused a nullification instruction, jurors are uncomfortable about disobey-
ing judicial instructions.39 If jurors had the right to nullify, however, then 
jurors could be informed of their power and right,40 and increased nullifica-
tion would ensue. Indeed, a study comparing nullification behavior by mock 
juries found that juries informed that they could nullify nullified more often 
than the uninformed control group.41 Finally, with the jury’s right to nullify, 
  33  See United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 218–21 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding jury instruction that the 
jury had a “duty” to convict if the facts proved every element of the offense). 
  34  See Thomas, 116 F.3d  at 616. 
  35  E.g., ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), Pattern Instruction 2.1 (2003) 
(“You must also follow the law as I explain it to you whether you agree with that law or not . . . .”). 
  36  See United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1302–04 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (approving the 
dismissal of a juror during jury deliberations who “was not applying the law as directed”); United States 
v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108–10 (D. Mass. 2008) (dismissing a juror during jury deliberations for 
engaging in juror nullification). 
  37  For Judge Posner’s particularly colorful analogy condemning nullification, see Braun v. Baldwin, 
346 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Although advocacy of jury nullification could no more be flatly for-
bidden than advocacy of Marxism, nudism, or Satanism, we cannot think of a more reasonable regula-
tion of the time, place, and manner of speech than to forbid its advocacy in a courthouse.”). 
  38  See Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the Court-
room, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 433 n.1 (1998); see also Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, THE AMERICAN 
JURY 56–57, 116 (1971) (providing data that indicates judges attribute to nullification only about 4 per-
cent of jury acquittals in criminal cases in which the judge would have convicted). 
  39  See Daryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury 
Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1245, 1248 (1998) (noting that in the video-
taped deliberations in Wisconsin v. Reed, jurors were reluctant to ignore the law and that their acquittal 
was not an act of nullification); Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries To De-
termine the Law, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 114–15 (1998) (noting that the jurors in Reed 
were uncomfortable about breaking the rules). 
  40  See Merced v. McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If jurors had a right to nullify, then 
a court would have a correlative duty to safeguard their ability to exercise this right.” (citing Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE 
L.J. 16, 32 (1913) (describing a legal taxonomy in which a duty is the correlative of a right))). 
  41  See Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Jury Nullification: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 66 Brook. 
L. Rev. 1207, 1236 (2001) (noting how an explicit nullification instruction altered the outcome of the  
April 2009  RECONSTRUCTION AND JURY NULLIFICATION 10 
attorneys could argue the unconstitutionality of a criminal statute to a jury,42 
giving the defendant an additional opportunity to raise reasonable doubt, 
and courts could not strip juries of citizens unwilling to implement the 
judges’ opinions on the law,43 resulting in fewer convictions. 
Nor has the right-power distinction been left undisturbed in its grave 
since the Sparf Court tried to bury it. With the rise of the Supreme Court’s 
originalism, scholars, lawyers, and judges have argued that Sparf should be 
revisited. This Part explains why Sparf is susceptible to Founding-era 
originalist challenges and how Reconstruction-era originalism may illumi-
nate the constitutionality of its holding. 
A. Founding-era Originalism and Jury Nullification 
Although Sparf has been the law of the land for more than a century, the 
current Supreme Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence has prioritized 
originalism over doctrinalism, suggesting that the Court may be receptive to 
modifying its nullification jurisprudence to accord with the Founding-era 
right. When the Warren Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
criminal jury trial against the states, it noted that “our decisions interpreting 
the Sixth Amendment are always subject to reconsideration.”44 The current 
Court has accepted that invitation. In overturning well-established prece-
dents and statutes through originalist reasoning,45 with some measure of 
disregard to the consequences of doing so, the Court has demonstrated its 
willingness to reject stare decisis and to repudiate criminal law doctrine that 
misunderstands the Constitution’s original meaning.46 
Some of the Court’s language has hinted that it may be open specifically 
to reevaluating Sparf’s disallowance of nullification. The accepted history 
that the disallowance was judicially driven, for example, conflicts with the 
Court’s finding that the framers did not leave the “definition of the scope of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
mock jury deliberations in Horowitz’s study); Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democ-
ratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563, 2588 (1997). 
  42  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1191 (1991); cf. 
Gibbs v. VanNatta, 329 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A jury does not have the authority to disregard 
the law, and as a result (a concrete consequence of the abstract distinction between power and authority) 
a defendant’s lawyer is not permitted to argue to the jury that it should disregard the law; nor does the 
judge let on to the jury that it has the power to acquit in the teeth of the law.”); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A 
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 336 (1st ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 1868) (“If the jury in a 
particular case, by the constitution or laws of the State, are judges of the law, it would seem that counsel 
should be at liberty to address them fully upon it . . . .”). 
  43  See Krauss, supra note 39, at 114. 
  44  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968). 
  45  E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980)); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (overturning state sentencing statutes). 
  46  See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008) (“In Crawford we accepted the 
petitioner’s argument that the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation that we had 
previously endorsed . . . needed reconsideration because it ‘stray[ed] from the original meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.’” (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42)).  
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jury power up to judges’ intuitive sense” because “they were unwilling to 
trust government to mark out the role of the jury.”47 Moreover, when recog-
nizing the need to expound on the historical ability of juries to check the ju-
diciary, the Court’s first resort was to cite favorably eighteenth-century jury 
nullification.48 Indeed, Justice Scalia, after calling juries “the spinal column 
of American democracy,” suggested that jurors should not permit judges “to 
interpret criminal laws oppressively,”49 implying that the jury has a legiti-
mate law-interpreting, and perhaps law-deciding, role, which means that 
they may be again permitted to nullify. 
Recognizing that Founding-era criminal juries had the right to determine 
the law, academics have made powerful originalist arguments contending 
that the criminal jury’s right to nullify is of constitutional dimension and 
should be restored.50 “Whether the ‘jury lost the right’ to disregard the 
judge’s instructions,” Professor Raoul Berger asserted in laying out the 
originalist critique of modern jury nullification doctrine, “may be doubted. 
If . . . that right was an ‘attribute’ of trial by jury at the adoption of the Con-
stitution, it was embodied therein, and therefore was beyond the power of 
courts to curtail.”51 In the pages of law journals today, scholars continue to 
make such arguments against Sparf’s holding.52 While some scholars dis-
agree that Founding-era history should affect contemporary jurisprudence, 
scholars almost unanimously agree that when the Constitution and Sixth 
Amendment were ratified in the late eighteenth century, the jury was under-
stood to have the right, not merely the power, to decide questions of law and 
thus to nullify.53 In supporting the conclusion that the jury’s right to nullify 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
  47  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004); accord Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–68. 
  48  See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246–48 (1999) (discussing the John Peter Zenger case). 
  49  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30, 32 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (explaining that the Constitution allows juries to thwart “judges willing to enforce oppressive 
criminal laws, and to interpret criminal laws oppressively” and that the Supreme Court may not cancel 
the jury’s criminal guilt-finding function). 
  50  See King, supra note 38, at 434 (noting a “renaissance of academic support for jury nullification,” 
including originalist-based argumentation); Krauss, supra note 39, at 121 & n.44 (discussing “powerful” 
originalist argumentation for nullification written by scholars). 
  51  See Raoul Berger, Justice Samuel Chase v. Thomas Jefferson: A Response to Stephen Presser, 
1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 873, 889–90. 
  52 For recent articles advocating originalism in jury jurisprudence, see Appleman, supra note 2, at 
397–98 (providing “the missing historical and constitutional justification for the Supreme Court’s fidel-
ity to the jury”); Chris Kemmitt, Function over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury’s Historical Role as a 
Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 106–07 (2006) (criticizing Sparf); Andrew J. Parmenter, 
Note, Nullifying the Jury: “The Judicial Oligarchy” Declares War on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN 
L.J. 379, 417–19 (2007) (arguing that nullification originally was “part of our constitutional system”). 
  53  Compare JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 
30–31, 37, 63–64, 75–76 (1994) (stating that Founding-era juries had the right to decide questions of 
law), AKHIL  REED  AMAR,  THE  BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION  97–103  (1998) 
(same), LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 157–58 (2004) (same), FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 40–41, 289 (1985) (same), WILLIAM NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF 
THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 21  
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was inherent in the Founding-era meaning of “jury,” scholars point to four 
categories of evidence. 
First, they quote the statements of intelligent and informed late-
eighteenth-century Americans regarding the jury’s right to decide questions 
of law.54 John Adams, for example, wrote, “It is not only [the juror’s] right, 
but his duty . . . to find the verdict according to his own best understand-
ing, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction 
of the court.”55 Zephaniah Swift, a future Chief Justice of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, wrote that juries were “the proper judges, not only of the 
fact but of the law that was necessarily involved.”56 For the Founding gen-
eration, the jury’s right to nullify was essential to deter overzealous offi-
cials, to check prosecutorial discretion, and to enable jurors to serve as the 
People’s voice.57 Theophilus Parsons, a future Chief Justice the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court, explained that jury nullification was necessary to se-
cure the proposition that “act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; 
and any man may be justified in his resistance. Innocent they [the jury] cer-
tainly will pronounce him, if the supposed law he resisted was an act of 
usurpation.”58 The jury, in other words, would determine the legitimacy of 
the law by answering the legal question of whether a law was an act of 
usurpation. For the Founding generation, this jury right to judge such 
questions of law rendered jury trial as critical as legislative lawmaking 
and the right to vote.59 Rivals Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamil-
ton—indeed, framers from all political viewpoints—understood the right of 
criminal trial by jury necessarily to encompass the jury’s right to nullify.60 
Second, scholars cite treatises and law books, which presented law as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(1975) (same), Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. 
REV. 377, and Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries As Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939) 
(same), with Krauss, supra note 39, at 119–21 (arguing that it is not clear to what extent Founding-era 
juries had the right to determine questions of law). 
  54  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 5, at 238, 581 n.73 (listing leading Americans who accepted the right 
of nullification). For the reasons why originalists look at “intelligent and informed” Founding-era 
Americans and not only the Constitution’s Framers, see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a 
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, 
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  
  55  John Adams, Diary (Feb. 12, 1771), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 255 (AMS Press 1971) 
(Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850). 
  56 Z EPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 410 (1795). 
  57  See generally AMAR, supra note 5, at 238–41; KRAMER, supra note 53, at 28–29, 157–58. 
  58 2  DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 94 (J. Elliot ed., 1888). 
  59  See, e.g., Adams, supra note 55, at 253 (“The common people should have as complete a control, 
as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court of judicature” as they have through the legisla-
ture.); Essays by a Farmer (IV), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 245, 249–50 (Herbert 
V. Storing ed., 1981) (“The trial by jury is . . . more necessary than representatives in the legislature 
. . . .”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 283, 284 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (“Were I called upon to decide whether the people had 
best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of 
the Legislative.”). 
  60  See CONRAD, supra note 17, at 50 (discussing Hamilton); Jefferson, supra note 59, at 284.  
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something juries could understand and should decide.61 In his 1794 treatise 
on New York practice, for example, William Wyche wrote that in criminal 
cases the juries may “take upon themselves the knowledge of the law.”62 
Jacob’s Law Dictionary, the most common legal dictionary in eighteenth-
century Virginia, explained that the jury may give a “verdict contrary to the 
evidence, or against the direction of the court; for the law supposes the jury 
may have some other evidence than what is given in court, and they may not 
only find things of their own knowledge, but they go according to their con-
sciences.”63 Moreover, late-eighteenth-century Americans took their under-
standing of the jury’s meaning by studying recent examples of nullification. 
More than any formal law book, A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of 
John Peter Zenger, a pamphlet reprinted fourteenth times in the half-century 
between Zenger’s trial and the Sixth Amendment’s ratification, taught 
Americans about the role and duties of jurors.64 During Zenger’s trial, his 
attorney Andrew Hamilton had declared that he knew juries “have the right 
beyond all dispute to determine both the law and the fact,”65 and the jury, 
interpreting the law, had acquitted Zenger against the judge’s instruction.66 
Founding-era Americans who read the pamphlet would have understood a 
jury to have the right to nullify. 
Third, scholars discuss the then-existing practices in state and federal 
courts, where jurors were the judges of law.67 Edward Tilghman told Con-
gress that in Pennsylvania judges inform the jurors “what, in the opinion of 
the court, was the law, but the jury were the judges of the law and the 
fact.”68 When a Connecticut plaintiff moved to set aside a verdict because 
the jury had mistaken the law and evidence, the state supreme court denied 
the motion, noting, “It doth not vitiate a verdict, that the jury have mistaken 
the law or the evidence; for by the practice of this state, they are judges of 
both.”69 In one of the U.S. Supreme Court’s only three jury cases,70 Chief 
Justice Jay charged the jurors that they had “a right to take upon yourselves 
to judge of both [law and fact], and to determine the law as well as the fact 
in controversy.”71 Similarly, Justices riding circuit often charged the jury 
that they decided “the law as well as the facts.”72 Justice Paterson, for ex-
ample, charged the jury that “if legislatures assumed to themselves the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  61  See KRAMER, supra note 53, at 163.  
  62 W ILLIAM WYCHE, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK IN CIVIL ACTIONS 168 (1794). 
  63 C ONRAD, supra note 17, at 46–47 (quoting Jacob’s Law Dictionary (1782)). 
  64  See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 2, at 873–74. 
  65 Krauss,  supra note 39, at 184 (quoting Hamilton). 
  66  See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 2, at 873. 
  67  See Howe, supra note 53, at 591–605  
  68  Id. at 595. 
  69  Wittner v. Brewster, 1 Kirby 422, 423 (Conn. 1788). 
  70  Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794). 
  71  Id. at 4. 
  72  E.g., Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 306 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).  
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power to enact unconstitutional laws they ought not to be binding upon ju-
ries; and . . . courts and juries were the proper bodies to decide on the con-
stitutionality of laws.”73 In the Whiskey Rebellion cases, judges allowed 
lawyers for both sides to debate before the jury the question of whether 
armed resistance to enforcement of the Excise Act constituted treason. The 
judges then advised the jury what their opinions on the law were, and the 
jury was permitted to decide among the lawyers’ and the judges’ statements 
in reaching their verdict.74 The jury’s right to decide questions of law was 
so integral to Founding-era juries that a few states explicitly included the 
right in their constitutions.75 While there were several practical reasons for 
the jury’s law-deciding right, such as trial benches consisting of multiple 
judges,76 the absence of reported precedents,77 and the lack of widespread 
legal education,78 another reason for the right was that the higher law of the 
Constitution was not supposed to be not a prolix legal code but rather a 
document accessible to the People.79 
Fourth, scholars point to the principal purpose behind Article III’s and 
the Sixth Amendment’s rights to jury trial: to prevent judges from issuing 
corrupt verdicts biased toward the federal government. Jefferson explained 
that “permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps” and are liable to be mis-
led “by sprit of party” or “by a devotion to the Executive or Legislative. . . . 
It is therefore left to the juries . . . to take upon themselves to judge the law 
as well as the fact.”80 His rival Hamilton agreed that the “strongest argu-
ment in [the jury’s] factor is that it is a security against corruption.”81 Be-
cause nullification was essential to protect constitutional rights from an 
overbearing government or judiciary, Professor Berger concludes, “It bor-
ders on the inconceivable to attribute to the Founders an intention to leave 
their ‘noble palladium’ at the mercy of judges who, according to Justice 
James Wilson, they had regarded with ‘aversion and distrust.’”82 
Given this Founding-era history, prominent officials and judges have 
taken the Court’s recent originalism to have already undermined Sparf and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  73 K RAMER, supra note 53, at 135 (quoting Justice Patterson). 
  74  See Harrington, supra note 53, at 402–03. 
  75  E.g., PA. CONST. of 1790 art. IX, § 7; see also Howe, supra note 53, at 587. 
  76  See KRAMER, supra note 53, at 158; Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 2, at 904–05 (explaining that 
Massachusetts trial benches had at least three judges); Harrington, supra note 74, at 390, 401 n.116 (ex-
plaining that the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted jurisdiction over serious federal criminal offenses to cir-
cuit courts that consisted of a district court judge and two Supreme Court Justices riding circuit). 
  77  See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 2, at 904–06. 
  78  See KRAMER, supra note 53, at 158; Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 2, at 904–05. 
  79  See Amar, supra note 42, at 1195. 
  80 Jefferson, supra note 59, at 283; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
VIRGINIA 140 (J. Randolph ed., 1853) (“[I]f the question relate to any point of public liberty, or if 
it be one of those in which the judges may be suspected of bias, the jury undertake to decide both 
law and fact.”). 
  81 T HE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 500 (discussing the civil jury). 
  82 Berger,  supra note 51, at 889.  
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modern jury nullification doctrine. While it is generally pro-defendant ad-
vocates who criticize the disallowance of nullification,83 fully half of the 
states’ attorneys general recently questioned Sparf’s legitimacy, noting that 
the “Court’s recent Sixth Amendment caselaw . . . is a corrective to the sin-
gle most important striking long-term trend in constitutional criminal proce-
dure: the systematic diminution of the jury’s autonomy, a process that has 
proceeded apace since Sparf v. United States.”84 More directly, several fed-
eral judges have even called for Sparf’s demise. 
Judge Lynch of the Southern District of New York did so implicitly 
when he proposed to instruct the jury about a child pornography offense’s 
mandatory minimum sentence so that, the Second Circuit found, “the jury 
could make an informed decision as whether to nullify the law.”85 Judge 
Lynch himself said that “historically jurors have sometimes done that [nul-
lify], and the judgment of history is sometimes . . . that they’ve done the 
right thing.”86 Although the Second Circuit issued a writ of mandamus pro-
hibiting Judge Lynch’s instruction and explained that an instruction would 
violate controlling authority that requires courts to forestall nullification,87 
Judge Lynch’s attempt to permit the jury to consider a sentencing question 
of law suggested judicial support for the restoration of nullification.88 De-
fending Judge Lynch’s attempt, Judge Middlebrooks of the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida soon thereafter issued a harsh originalist critique of Sparf.89 
Prohibiting jury nullification “was not the original intent of the founding fa-
thers,” he wrote. “Sparf was not only wrong on the facts and wrong on the 
law, it was and remains an assault on democracy. . . . The bludgeoning of 
the jury in Sparf and before has harmed the credibility and legitimacy of the 
judicial branch. It should not have happened and should not continue.” He 
concluded that the Court in Sparf “took a wrong turn. Its holding is an as-
sault on constitutional government that should be reconsidered.”90 
In 2008, accepting Judge Middlebrooks’s invitation and revisiting Judge 
Lynch’s issue, Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York took the 
ultimate step when he deemed Sparf no longer good law in light of the Su-
preme Court’s originalist jurisprudence. In a colossal 150-page opinion, 
Judge Weinstein, a long-time nullification sympathizer,91 held that he had 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
  83  See, e.g., CONRAD,  supra note 17, at v (dedicating book advocating “jury independence” to 
“[d]efenders”); King, supra note 38, at 434 (discussing the growth of the pro-defendant and pro-
nullification Fully Informed Jury Association). 
  84  Brief for New Mexico et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17, Kansas v. Ventris, No. 
07-1356 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2008), 2008 WL 5026648. Twenty-five states signed the brief. 
  85  United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2004).  
  86  Id. (quoting Judge Lynch).  
  87  See id. at 91, 94–95 (citing Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994)).  
  88  See also United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411, 418 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). 
  89  See Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson’s Jury: Sparf and Hansen v. United 
States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 353, 419–21 (2004). 
  90  Id. at 353–55,  421. 
  91  See Jack B. Weinstein, The Many Dimensions of Jury Nullification, 81 JUDICATURE 168, 170  
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committed reversible constitutional error when he declined to tell the jury 
about the mandatory minimum sentence of a child pornography offense be-
cause the jury had the right to consider the sentence and to nullify the law.92 
Reasoning that Supreme Court decisions issued after Judge Lynch’s case re-
quired judges to assess jury rights through originalism rather than precedent, 
Judge Weinstein turned to the Founding-era history of nullification. Based 
on historical analysis, he declared that Sparf has been “largely abrogated”93 
by the Court’s recent Sixth Amendment decisions because Justice Gray’s 
dissent defending nullification,94 and not Justice Harlan’s opinion for the 
majority, “had the history of the Sixth Amendment right.”95 
    Whatever the judicial system’s evaluation of modern juries and their proper 
role, the Supreme Court has recently instructed us that in matters of sentencing 
as well as hearsay, it is necessary to go back to the practice as it existed in 1791 
to construe the meaning of constitutional provisions such as the Sixth Amend-
ment. Justice Gray dissenting in Sparf seems to have hit both the modern and 
ancient marks exactly. Judges are forcefully reminded in Crawford v. Washing-
ton . . . that no matter how long and firm a precedential line of Supreme Court 
cases, if analysis shows it was ill-based historically it must be abandoned. 
    It is worthwhile recalling that the author of the majority opinion in Sparf 
was the first Justice Harlan. His minority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, which 
approved over his strong dissent the doctrine of separate but equal, degrading 
African-Americans, was adopted more than a half century later in Brown v. 
Board of Education. By contrast, Justice Harlan’s Sparf majority ruling limiting 
jury power is in effect overruled now, more than a century later, by the recent 
Booker line of cases, essentially adopting the minority conclusion in Sparf. It is 
not particularly significant that the same 1890s Supreme Court appears to have 
been wrong—by our present standards—on two important cases, but it is nota-
ble that the Supreme Court feels called upon now to overrule major precedents 
going back to the late nineteenth century based upon a revised historical analy-
sis.96 
Judge Weinstein is so far alone among his colleagues on the bench in be-
lieving that Sparf, has, as a matter of law, been overruled.97 Still, the fact 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(1998) (calling nullification “the stuff . . . of our somewhat romantic democratic tradition”); Jack B. 
Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law To Do Jus-
tice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 240, 244 (1993) (arguing that “[w]hen juries refuse to convict on the 
basis of what they think are unjust laws, they are performing their duty as jurors” and that 
“[n]ullification arising from idealism is good for the American soul”). 
  92  United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 404, 449–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
  93  Id. at 435. 
  94  Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 113 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (arguing that the judge’s in-
struction unconstitutionally “denied [the jury the] right to decide the law”). 
  95  Polizzi, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 421. 
  96  Id. at 421–22 (internal citations omitted). 
  97 For examples of post-Booker decisions upholding the disallowance of jury nullification, see 
United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 304 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 329 (3d 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108–10 (D. Mass. 2008). For the Supreme 
Court’s most recent discussion of Sparf, see United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512–14 (1995).  
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that such a prominent jurist has asserted that Sparf is invalid—and com-
pared it to Plessy,  among the gravest of insults he could deliver to any judi-
cial opinion—and that at least two other federal judges may agree with him 
shows that pro-nullification arguments may one day prevail in the lower 
courts and the originalist Supreme Court. Indeed, Judge Weinstein implies 
that the case formally overturning Sparf may be the next Brown. Sparf, in 
brief, is under assault, Founding-era originalism is trying to slay it. Even if 
the courts do not overturn Sparf, these historical arguments still illustrate 
that the Court’s criminal procedure originalism contradicts its nullification 
doctrine, and this contradiction may lead the courts to desire a more rational 
way of reconciling the substantive inconsistency.98 
B. Nineteenth-Century Judicial Lawmaking and Constitutional Change 
The right-power distinction matters not only for its implications on con-
temporary jurisprudence but also because the transformation of nullification 
from a cherished right to an illegitimate power has normative implications 
for constitutional change. If nullification was enshrined in the original con-
stitutional meaning of “jury,” then the People, in ratifying the Constitution 
and the Sixth Amendment, may have superdemocratically established that 
right, creating a federal legislative process that incorporated a veto by jurors 
who had a right to nullify laws, even those passed by an elected Congress. 
Nineteenth-century judges, without pursuing the Article V or another 
“higher-lawmaking” process,99 undemocratically altered the Constitution’s 
meaning by disallowing the right to nullify. Regardless of the merits or de-
merits of jury nullification, permitting nineteenth-century judges to override 
the Constitution’s original meaning by judicial fiat may provide a weaker 
normative foundation for the disallowance of nullification than a textual ba-
sis, grounded in a superdemocratic constitutional amendment, would offer. 
Even scholars who do not call for a Founding-era originalist restoration 
of the right to nullify have long found nullification’s disallowance troubling 
in terms of normatively justifiable methods of constitutional change. In his 
classic 1939 Harvard Law Review article on nullification, Professor Mark 
Howe observed that the judges defeated “the people’s aspiration for democ-
ratic government” by disallowing the right. “What seems discreditable to 
the judiciary in the story which I have related is the fierce resolution and 
deceptive ingenuity with which the courts have refused to carry out the un-
qualified mandate of statutes and constitutions.” His final sentence con-
cluded that it was possible to feel that the disallowance of nullification was 
“wise without approving the . . . methods which courts have used in reach-
ing that result.”100 Nor has scholarly opinion changed over the next seventy 
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  98  For criticism of this inconsistency, see Recent Case, 122 HARV. L. REV. 990 (2009). 
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years. “What is especially striking about the decline of the jury’s power over 
law is the way in which it was carried out,” Professor Matthew Harrington 
wrote recently. “The drive to limit the law-finding function was entirely a 
judge-led exercise, carried out without legislative warrant and sometimes in 
the face of legislative enactments to the contrary.”101 Indeed, scholars have 
viewed the disallowance as primarily an episode of judicial lawmaking. 
When judges first attempted to take the law-deciding right away from 
the jury, legislatures fought back and impeached them. In 1803, the Penn-
sylvania legislature removed Judge Addison from office because he at-
tempted to enforce his view that the state did not “vest the interpretation of 
declaring of laws, in bodies [juries] so constituted” because it would make 
laws fluctuate with “every changing passion and opinion of jurors.”102 Two 
years later, the U.S. House of Representatives impeached Justice Chase on 
similar grounds. While riding circuit, Justice Chase had told the jury in John 
Fries’s trial for leading a mob protest against federal taxes that constitu-
tional questions were the sole province of the judiciary, and he also refused 
to permit Thomas Callendar’s attorney to argue the unconstitutionality of 
the Sedition Act to the jury.103 Consequently, he was impeached for, among 
other reasons, “endeavouring to wrest from the jury their indisputable right 
to hear argument, and determine upon the question of the law.”104 Although 
the Senate failed to convict him of the charge, Justice Chase was forced to 
respond to the charge by admitting that the jurors “were to decide both the 
law and the facts.”105 
Although legislative opposition continued, the judicial disallowance of 
nullification ultimately prevailed.106 Beginning in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century, judges, elite lawyers, and commercial interests began 
echoing Justice Chase and Judge Addison’s view that there was a sharp dis-
tinction between law and fact and a correspondingly clear separation of 
function between judge and jury.107 Attempting to foreclose that view and 
to codify the jury’s law-deciding function, several states responded with leg-
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  101 Harrington,  supra note 5374, at 380. 
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dispute when the jury’s role was confined to fact-finding, with some dating the disallowance of nullifica-
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islation. Tennessee, for example, guaranteed that in all criminal cases “the 
jury shall have a right to determine the law and the facts,”108 and as the em-
bargo crisis embroiled Massachusetts in 1808, the legislature declared the 
right of juries to judge law and fact in criminal cases.109 Likewise, in 1821, 
Connecticut provided that in criminal cases the court was merely “to state 
[its] opinion to the jury, upon all questions of law, arising in the trial . . . and 
to submit to their consideration both the law and the facts,”110 while in 
1827, an Illinois statute said that “juries in all [criminal] cases shall be 
judges of the law and fact.”111 
Starting with federal courts in the 1830s, however, judges began to de-
clare that as a matter of law criminal juries were mere fact-finders.112 While 
in 1830, Justice Baldwin had issued instructions permitting nullification,113 
two years later, when an attorney defended his client on a charge of counter-
feiting United States Bank notes by arguing to the jury that the bank’s char-
ter was unconstitutional, he instructed the jury that the law was constitu-
tional. “The power to judge of the law as well as the fact in a criminal case,” 
he said, was no more than the power “to ascertain the existence of a law; if 
you see it in the statute book, you cannot on your oaths say there is no law, 
or exercise a power denied to the people of a state by the most solemn con-
stitutional provision, declare the supreme law to be void.”114 Justice Story 
even more vigorously denied the jury’s right to nullify. “It is the duty of the 
court to instruct the jury as to the law,” he declared, “and it is the duty of the 
jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court.”115 Although Justice 
Story’s instruction was issued in the context of preventing a slave trade 
capital conviction not covered by the statute as he construed it, his decision 
was applied to prohibit pro-defendant nullification too, and more effectively 
than any other decision, it deflected the current of judicial opinion away 
from permitting criminal juries to decide questions of law.116 
In the 1840s, some state courts began to follow the federal example, and 
the legislatures once again tried to forestall them. In 1851, the Indiana and 
Maryland constitutions were amended to guarantee the jury’s right to nul-
lify.117 Yet legislative enactments often counted for little. After the Massa-
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April 2009  RECONSTRUCTION AND JURY NULLIFICATION 20 
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court had disallowed the jury’s right to nul-
lify,118 the state legislature, motivated partly by contempt for the recent Fu-
gitive Slave Act,119 passed a new statute reasserting the jury’s right to re-
solve questions of law,120 but the Supreme Judicial Court, in 
Commonwealth v. Anthes,121 immediately nullified the law and thus the 
jury’s right to nullify.122 Cases like Anthes became the heart of Justice 
Harlan’s opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court in Sparf as Justice Harlan de-
voted little attention to Founding-era history but extensively cited nine-
teenth-century precedent.123 He found that Anthes offered the “fullest ex-
amination” of the nullification question and therefore relied upon Chief 
Justice Shaw’s observation that “though the jury had the power they had not 
the right to decide, that is, to adjudicate, on both law and evidence.”124 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The judiciary, of course, had reasons for disallowing the right to nullify. 
The increasing professionalization of the bench and bar and availability of 
law books convinced judges that they were the proper body to determine 
questions of law.125 The need for certainty, stability, and uniformity in com-
mercial law, and its symmetrical application to criminal law, also persuaded 
them that the more centralized judiciary should restrain the law-finding 
right of local juries.126 Since federal and state criminal statutes were now 
democratically enacted, the populist rationale weighing in favor of the jury’s 
law-finding and liberty-protecting role had been diminished.127 
Yet, these rationales are problematic. Professor Morton Horwitz, for ex-
ample, describes the “subjugation of juries” as an elite-driven process that 
expanded the political power of the legal profession and the commercial in-
terests at the lower classes’ expense.128 Furthermore, if the disallowance of 
nullification really was democracy-enhancing, it seems odd that states were 
passing legislation that attempted to protect from the judiciary the jury’s 
right to nullify. Finally, since the right to nullify was understood to be an at-
tribute of jury trial when the Sixth Amendment was ratified—a time when 
shall be the Judges of the Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain a conviction.”). These provisions are still in effect. See IND. CONST. art I, § 19; 
MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. XXIII; see also GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ 11(a). 
  118  See Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 263, 285–86 (1845). 
  119  See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 177 n.47 
(1964) (explaining why contempt for the Fugitive Slave Act, rather than for temperance laws as Profes-
sor Howe had alleged, was the strongest pro-nullification motivating factor). 
  120  See Mass. Acts & Resolves 1855, ch. 152, at 590, now Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 11 (1932). The 
bill passed the Massachusetts State House by a vote of 202–106, illustrating its popularity. 
  121  71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185 (1855). 
  122  Id. at 193. 
  123  See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 71–86 (1895) (discussing nineteenth-century cases). 
  124  Id. at 80 (quoting Antes, 71 Mass. at 206) (misquotations in original). 
  125  See Harrington, supra note 5374, at 380, 405. 
  126  See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 2, at 917; Harrington, supra note 5374, at 380, 399, 405, 436. 
  127  See MACDONALD, supra note 53, at 41; Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 2, at 917; Harrington, su-
pra note 5374, at 423, 427, 438. 
  128  See HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 143.  
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all federal crimes were democratically criminalized129—an originalist Court 
may question whether the judiciary’s policy arguments and evolving jury 
law may trump what had been understood as a constitutional right. In con-
tradistinction to the evolutionary, extratextual, and class-based nature of the 
antebellum disallowance of nullification, which may not have been of con-
stitutional dimension, stands the revolutionary, textual, and superdemocratic 
process of constitutional amendment ratification. Instead of relying on the 
nineteenth-century judicial disallowance of nullification, as Justice Harlan 
did in Sparf, an originalist Supreme Court may be more consistent and more 
grounded if it looked at the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
C. The Fourteenth Amendment and Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
There is, of course, an overarching doctrinal problem with using the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction-era history in constitutional 
criminal procedure—like nullification doctrine, it too contradicts the Su-
preme Court’s recent jurisprudence. In applying legal history analysis to its 
criminal procedure jurisprudence, the Court has emphasized the eighteenth 
century, particularly in the context of the Bill of Rights’s adoption, but, as 
Professor David Alan Sklansky observed, it has largely “missed” the nine-
teenth century and Reconstruction Era.130 Most scholars, including even 
sometimes Professor Amar,131 have also ignored or minimized Reconstruc-
tion’s influence on constitutional criminal procedure.132 
The Court’s canonical explanation of incorporation is that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause simply took the fundamental rights “im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty”133 or “necessary to an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty,”134 including the criminal procedure 
rights set forth in the Bill of Rights that are “fundamental in the context of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  129   In contrast to colonial-era Parliament-enacted criminal statutes, all federal criminal statutes were 
enacted by a democratic Congress, and the Supreme Court established early on that there is no federal 
criminal common law. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (mem.); Ben 
Rosenberg, The Growth of the Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 193, 195–96 (2002). 
  130  See Lecture Notes, David Alan Sklansky, The Missing Years: Nineteenth-Century History in 
Criminal Procedure (June 14, 2006). 
  131  See AMAR, supra note 4 (arguing that the “first principles” to which constitutional criminal proce-
dure should return are the principles of the 1780s–90s, not the 1860s–70s). Of course, Professor Amar is 
probably the leading scholar who explains how the original Bill of Rights was transformed by the Re-
construction amendments, and he has written extensively on how Reconstruction has influenced consti-
tutional criminal procedure. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 165. Still, he has, for example, advocated a 
return to Founding-era search-and-seizure law, even though modern police date from the antebellum era. 
Compare Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment: First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (argu-
ing that strict warrant requirements conflict with the Fourth Amendment’s late-eighteenth-century his-
tory), with LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149 (1993) (ex-
plaining that the police “were essentially an invention of the first half of the [nineteenth] century”). 
  132  See Sklansky, supra note 130. 
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  134  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).  
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the criminal processes maintained by the American States,”135 and applied 
them against the states without altering their meaning.136 In other words, 
the Court assumes an “essentially mechanical process” of incorporation that 
does not reshape or reinterpret Founding-era doctrines to fit the Reconstruc-
tion-era amendment.137 By doing so, the Court has taken the Due Process 
Clause to have incorporated, for example, the Sixth Amendment and also its 
eighteenth-century context—but not the Due Process Clause’s own Recon-
struction-era context.138 Consequently, when incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment in Duncan v. Louisiana,139 the Court focused exclusively on 
the jury’s role in the colonial era.140 While the Court correctly observed that 
the Founding-era right to jury trial was “granted to criminal defendants in 
order to prevent oppression by the Government,”141 the Court neglected to 
assess, in light of the fact that Reconstruction-era juries themselves were 
sometimes used to facilitate oppression or as instruments of oppression, 
whether the Reconstruction-era right to jury trial preserved exactly the same 
jury rights that the Founding-era right did. The Court simply assumed that 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, ratified in 1868, incorporated the 1791 
meaning of trial by jury, rather than the 1868 meaning.142 
Yet, the omission of Reconstruction-era history makes little doctrinal 
sense from an originalist or textualist viewpoint considering that the Four-
teenth Amendment is a product of Reconstruction, not the Founding, and 
that the amendment remains the necessary constitutional hook for the con-
stitutional regulation of state criminal trials.143 Despite appearances, the 
Supreme Court does not apply the Bill of Rights directly to state criminal 
procedure rights but rather incorporates it only by reference to due process 
in the Fourteenth Amendment. This suggests that the constitutional text that 
the Court is technically interpreting is the Due Process Clause, and therefore 
Reconstruction understandings of due process and its relation to the Bill of 
Rights, should be of special concern to a Court trying to bring originalism 
and textualism into constitutional criminal procedure.144 Therefore, at least 
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in state criminal procedure cases, if original understanding or historical con-
text matter in interpreting constitutional provisions, then the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s backdrop should be even more important than the backdrop 
of the original Bill of Rights. 
There are reasons to believe that the Reconstruction-era history should 
matter in federal criminal procedure cases too. State cases comprise the 
overwhelming majority of all criminal trials,145 and they produce the large 
majority of the modern Court’s criminal procedure doctrine.146 If, as reverse 
incorporation suggests, consistent constitutional rules between state and 
federal practices are desirable, then the Court may be justified in using the 
Reconstruction-era-based constitutional rules for state courts to reverse in-
corporate the federal criminal procedure rules. Alternatively, in Amarian 
theory, the Fourteenth Amendment may have transformed the criminal pro-
cedure provisions of the original Bill of Rights, rendering the Reconstruc-
tion-era meaning applicable even without reverse incorporation, or the 
original meaning of its corresponding provisions may have superseded the 
earlier meanings in the Bill of Rights.147 At a minimum, in Ackermanian 
language, the jurisprudence of a text drafted and ratified during time “two” 
(Reconstruction) should be governed by a synthesis of the original mean-
ings at times “one” (the Founding) and “two,”148 or perhaps even by only 
the new original meaning at time “two.” Quite simply, the modern Court 
and its scholars should not monopolize the Founding Era when they are ap-
plying originalism. 
This is especially true given the nature of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For example, its framers’ conception of the role of the courts and judges 
was fundamentally different from the Founders’ conception. The Founders 
feared the federal judiciary and circumscribed its reach. The Reconstruction 
Congresses, on the other hand, embraced it. In the civil context, for exam-
ple, while the First Congress elected not to give the lower federal courts 
federal question jurisdiction out of fear that it would make these courts too 
powerful,149 the Reconstruction Congress in 1875 granted them federal 
question jurisdiction to bring federal law into the federal courts.150 Simi-
larly, the Founding Era’s Eleventh Amendment overruled a recent Supreme 
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Court decision and stripped the federal judicial power to hear certain diver-
sity lawsuits involving the states;151 conversely, in 1867 Congress expanded 
the federal courts’ jurisdiction to give them for the first time the authority to 
issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners,152 and in 1869 Congress cre-
ated a new nine-member circuit court judiciary to carry federal judicial au-
thority into the states.153 Federal criminal trial courts were strengthened as 
well; the monumental Ku Klux Klan trials of 1871 and 1872 were an un-
precedented use of federal legal power over criminal law to secure new con-
stitutional protection for blacks.154 The use of new federal courts and new 
jury laws, as in the Ku Klux Klan trials, illustrates that the Reconstruction 
Congresses had a new conception of judicial power—one understood and 
intended to protect victims’ civil rights. 
Along those lines, the Fourteenth Amendment framers’ shared a new vi-
sion of constitutional rights. The original Bill of Rights, including the Sixth 
Amendment, was not premised upon preventing majority tyranny and pro-
tecting minority rights. Rather, it was established to prevent self-dealing and 
corruption by a distant, possibly unrepresentative federal government and 
judiciary. In expressing the need for strong jury rights at the federal level, 
after all, even political rivals like Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jeffer-
son agreed that inhibiting corrupted judges was a primary rationale.155 In-
deed, the structure of the original Bill of Rights was built upon allowing lo-
calities to reign in federal officials. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, 
repudiated this structure, transforming the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights into a minority-rights protecting regime.156 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, in other words, demanded that the Constitution take into account the 
civil rights of victims being tyrannized by local majorities. 
Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment created a new reading of ro-
bust federal power that prioritized nationalism over localism. States and lo-
cal bodies like juries no longer were the constitutional mechanism primarily 
responsible for protecting civil rights. On the contrary, the Fourteenth 
Amendment charged the federal government with the authority to protect 
and to enforce civil rights. Indeed, the entire apparatus of the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments was to expand federal power into and against localities—
hence the amendments’ Congressional enforcement language, which stands 
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in stark contradiction to the first eleven amendments,157 and corresponding 
enforcement legislation, which, like the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ran 
through the federal courts.158 The Fourteenth Amendment made such fed-
eral enforcement of the civil right to protection of life, liberty, property, and 
security an immediate constitutional priority, one that may have superseded 
older implicit constitutional rights that denied federal authority and defeated 
its federalism-revolutionizing and federal rights-protecting objectives. 
These changes implicate criminal procedure and nullification doctrine 
because they suggest a different allocation of authority between judge and 
jury. When the jury loses its right to decide questions of law, the law-
deciding right does not disappear but rather is transferred to a strengthened 
judiciary, which makes sense in the context of the Reconstruction Con-
gresses’ empowerment of the federal judiciary. At the Founding, when, as 
the Alien and Sedition Acts illustrated, the paradigmatic citizens in need of 
constitutional protection were localist critics of the federal government be-
ing accused of violating Congress’s laws, being prosecuted by the Executive 
Branch’s agents, and being tried under the pro-administration judiciary, the 
Constitution demanded strong jury rights to protect these citizens. During 
Reconstruction, however, the paradigmatic citizens who required protection 
were freedmen, Unionists, or women being persecuted by local majorities in 
the South or the West.159 Carpetbag federal judges appointed by a rights-
protecting government in Washington became better protectors of rights, 
while juries, particularly those taking the law into their own hands and nulli-
fying criminal statutes, were now the corrupt bodies that needed to be cur-
tailed. Disallowing nullification would do so while preventing a local 
body—the jury—from challenging governmental authority, just as Recon-
struction was designed to ensure that localism could not trump nationalism. 
In short, the Fourteenth Amendment context matters because it tells us 
what “due process” in relation to the law of judges and juries, civil rights, 
and federalism originally meant when the nation ratified the Due Process 
Clause in 1868. Nor are the objections to this Reconstruction-era “new 
original meaning” jurisprudence unanswerable. Some Fourteenth Amend-
ment “due process” questions, of course, may be impossible to answer 
through historical inquiry. Professor William Nelson has contended that 
whether the Due Process Clause was meant to preclude states from enacting 
antiabortion legislation, for example, never occurred to the Reconstruction 
generation and “hence cannot be answered by examining records of its ac-
tual thought.”160 Yet, criminal procedure jurisprudence is different because 
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its issues arose during Reconstruction and received substantial Congres-
sional attention. Since Reconstruction-era treatises discussed criminal pro-
cedure and the Reconstruction Congresses often debated criminal procedure 
matters, there are legitimate historical answers as to how these Congresses 
and their generation understood issues like jury nullification. Indeed, crimi-
nal procedure was not merely incidental to the Fourteenth Amendment but 
was at its very core—ingrained in the meaning of “due process.” 
Others may object that the Reconstruction generation, like its Founding 
forbearers, understood a Fourteenth Amendment term such as “due proc-
ess,” or even terms in the original Bill of Rights, to refer to “natural rights” 
descended from the law of nature and enshrined with the same, unchanging 
meaning since the Magna Charta.161 In other words, the Reconstruction 
Congresses may not have understood that their conception of “due process” 
or, assuming incorporation, their conception of the Bill of Rights could have 
been and was indeed different from the Founding-era conception. This ob-
jection, however, is also unsound. Normatively, it may not matter whether 
the Reconstruction generation understood the due process right and the cor-
responding right to criminal jury trial as timeless, fixed natural rights be-
cause what counts, under an originalist theory, is the text’s meaning when it 
was written into the Constitution, in 1868. Descriptively, the objection is 
verifiably false; the Reconstruction generation, as both statements in Con-
gress and treatises illustrate, understood that the substantive meaning of 
“jury,” a component of due process, had evolved over time.162 
Of course, the discovery, or rediscovery, of Reconstruction-era history 
may not always make a difference because meanings may not always 
evolve. Just as the Supreme Court now says that the Fourteenth Amendment 
entirely swallows up, for example, the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy 
Clause163 or Self-Incrimination Clause,164 the Court may find that (1) the 
meaning of “due process” in 1868 included a double jeopardy or self-
crimination protection identical to the 1791 meaning or (2) the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the Fifth Amendment against the states, and the 
Fifth Amendment had the same meaning in 1868 as it had in 1791, so the 
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  161  Cf. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856) 
(“The words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, 
‘by the law of the land,’ in Magna Charta.”). 
  162  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 822 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (“[A]t the 
beginning the jurors were witnesses from the neighborhood, afterward becoming judges, not of the law, 
but of the fact.”); JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY § 376, at 440–41 (San Francisco, 
Sumner Whitney & Co. 1876) (“[T]he doctrine that the jury could take the law into their own hands was 
a popular one before and at the time of the Revolution. . . . But the doctrine was in due time discarded, 
the courts one after another holding it was the duty of the jury to be guided as to the law by the court.”); 
FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 3094, at 1115 (4th ed., 
Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1857) (“For some time after the adoption of the federal constitution, a con-
trary doctrine [on the jury’s right to decide questions of law], it is true, was generally received.”). 
  163  See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
  164  See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).  
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Fifth Amendment’s meaning was not transformed, reconstructed, or super-
seded through its application to the states. Nevertheless, this often will not 
be the case,165 and unless it is, Founding-era originalism should not mo-
nopolize the post–Fourteenth Amendment Constitution’s original meaning. 
The Reconstruction-era history matters; an originalist Court should not as-
sume that the meaning of constitutional words remained constant over 
three-quarters of a century, particularly given the political turmoil of Recon-
struction, or that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers understood that they 
were incorporated eighteenth-century meanings into their nineteenth-
century amendment. Indeed, this paper shows that the Thirty-ninth Congress 
had a different understanding of trial by jury with respect to the jury’s right 
to nullify than the First Congress had. This understanding illuminates a dif-
ferent, new constitutional original meaning. 
D. Reconstruction-era Originalism and Jury Nullification 
The leading scholar who discusses the ways in which Reconstruction 
transformed the original Bill of Rights, Professor Amar, upon whose shoul-
ders this paper stands, once provided a snapshot of how the original mean-
ing of Article III’s and the Sixth Amendment’s criminal jury clauses possi-
bly could have been supplanted by the meaning imbued to them through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In a classic Yale Law Journal article, he theorized: 
The strongest defense of [the Supreme Court’s] holding [in Sparf] comes from 
provisions never cited by the Court, namely the Civil War Amendments. . . . 
[J]ury review would have created in fundamentally local bodies a power that 
approached de facto nullification in a wide range of situations. Existence of such 
a power in local bodies to nullify Congress’ Reconstruction statutes might have 
rendered the Civil War Amendments a virtual dead letter. Thus it is plausible to 
think that these Amendments implicitly qualified the (equally implicit) power of 
local juries to thwart national laws.166 
In other words, the theory is that in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the People superdemocratically constitutionalized the undemocratic nine-
teenth-century judicial precedent that had disallowed the jury’s right to nul-
lify, thus constitutionally legitimizing Sparf’s holding and contemporary 
nullification jurisprudence, at least for state cases, if not federal ones too. 
  Amar himself, however, not only never endorses the thesis—labeling it 
merely “plausible”—but actually rejects it. Amar thinks that the thesis he 
expounded would be a “stronger” defense of a still incorrect holding in 
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  165  See Akhil Reed Amar, Reconstructing Double Jeopardy: Some Thoughts on the Rodney King 
Case, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1995) (suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment’s dual sovereignty 
principles transformed the Double Jeopardy Clause); Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth 
Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 913–15 (1995) (sug-
gesting that the Reconstruction Congresses’ understanding of the self-incrimination clause may have 
been different from the Founding-era understanding). 
  166 Amar,  supra note 42, at 1195; see also AMAR, supra note 53, at 103.  
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Sparf. Believing that jurors have some constitutional right to nullify, Amar 
has said that the Sparf Court went too far and that Judges Lynch and 
Weinstein were correct that juries have the right to take sentencing law into 
account and to nullify the criminal statutes in some cases.167 Since first 
theorizing about Sparf, he has published a lengthy argument for the jury’s 
right “to play a role in deciding some questions of constitutional law” and 
“the jury’s right to nullify in order to do justice in a particular case.”168 
Calling the “constitutional case for nullification . . . strong,” he has stated 
that when the jury is deliberately kept “in the dark” about “the existence of 
a constitutional right” to nullify, “both the defendant and the jurors are ef-
fectively denied their rights.”169 Most recently, Amar has suggested that 
American juries have a Founding-era “right to acquit against the evidence,” 
a right that supports a limited form of jury legal question review and that 
“even today arguably encompasses the authority to acquit for reasons of 
constitutional scruple.” He concludes, “Though twenty-first-century judicial 
orthodoxy frowns on these claims of constitutional competence, the right of 
. . . trial juries to just say no in certain contexts draws strength from the let-
ter and spirit of the Bill of Rights.”170 Amar, thus, is no advocate of the 
view that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the judicial disal-
lowance of the right to nullify. 
  In addition to the fact that Amar himself rejects it, there are other issues 
with the argument he put forward. Sparf arose from a federal prosecution, 
not a state one, yet the Fourteenth Amendment commonly is assumed to ap-
ply only to state action. Professor Amar does not explain why the Four-
teenth Amendment should be understood to apply to federal jury nullifica-
tion too. Moreover, while the Founding-era right of local juries to thwart 
national laws may have been “implicit,” it was once well-established and 
widely recognized. Amar, like most other scholars, believes that the Found-
ing-era right was real.171 On the other hand, a Reconstruction-era principle 
or counter-right against nullification based in law enforcement or victims’ 
rights to protection has not been previously recognized by others because 
current scholarship has not answered whether the Fourteenth Amendments’ 
framers, unlike their Founding-era forbearers, understood the right of trial 
by jury not to include the jury’s right to nullify. Professor Nancy King also 
raised other criticisms of Amar’s conjecture: 
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  167  Interview with Akhil Reed Amar, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Univ., in 
Cambridge, Mass. (Apr. 14, 2009). 
  168 A KHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS 
ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 94, 113 (1998). 
  169  Id. at 106–07; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 685 
(1997) (“The role of the criminal jury . . . involves even more than reliable factfinding . . . . It also in-
volves normative judgment.”). 
  170 A MAR, supra note 5, at 241. 
  171  See AMAR, supra note 5, at 238–39; AMAR, supra note 53, at 97–103; AMAR, supra note 4, at 123; 
Amar, supra note 42, at 1187–95.  
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The suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly repealed the power of 
the jury, assuming such power once existed, is problematic. The interest of the 
government or of the victim in a conviction free from nullification is difficult to 
characterize as part of the due process guaranteed by that amendment, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not inevitably incompatible with jury nullification 
power.172 
Confronted with King’s response, Amar raised: 
an alternative argument pertaining to how the role of the criminal jury was 
modified by the Fourteenth Amendment: by the time the Fourteenth Amendment 
was adopted, the jury’s power to determine the law had eroded so dramatically 
that whatever the scope of jury rights incorporated by that amendment to the 
states, it did not include jury nullification.173 
  Yet, Amar’s second argument is problematic too, beyond the fact that 
Amar himself believes in some right of nullification. This argument may be 
sound only if it is historically accurately in asserting that the jury’s right to 
determine the law had been eroded so dramatically by 1868, which is a far 
more complicated question than determining the jury’s right in 1791. Since 
prior nullification scholarship has not addressed the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Reconstruction Era has not previously been viewed as a demarcation 
line. On the one hand, the narrow five-to-four Sparf decision was not issued 
until 1895, suggesting that the disallowance of nullification was not yet 
clearly established law during the Reconstruction Era. On the other hand, 
many lower federal courts and some state high courts had disallowed nulli-
fication by 1868 (but many had not). 
  Moreover, even if nullification had been widely disallowed by 1868, 
were Congress and the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers aware of the 
change and did they approve of it? Would it be normatively justifiable for 
the Fourteenth Amendment to have constitutionalized undemocratic judicial 
precedent of which its framers were unaware or disapproved? Finally, 
Amar’s second argument posits a different substantive outcome than his 
first. In the first, he suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment “qualified” or 
transformed the Sixth Amendment, implying that the disallowance of nulli-
fication was constitutionalized in both state and federal courts. In the sec-
ond, though, he suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment simply did not in-
corporate part of the Sixth Amendment, implying that the disallowance was 
constitutionalized with respect only to state courts. Absent an unstated re-
verse incorporation, this argument suggests that contra Sparf, an originalist 
Supreme Court should restore the right to nullify in the federal courts. 
  King’s response is also beset by a lack of historical specificity. She 
makes two claims, both of which this paper disputes. First, she claims that 
the Due Process Clause did not include a rights-based interest of the victim 
in a jury free from nullification, but a cogent argument has been made that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  172 King,  supra note 38, at 457 n.102. 
  173  Id.  
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the Fourteenth Amendment protects the victim’s interest in criminal convic-
tions and that its framers understood it to do so.174 Second, she claims that 
the Reconstruction Amendments were not incompatible with the theory of 
the right to nullify. Her claim may not even be true in the abstract, since the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s text prioritized the rule of law over local auton-
omy, but even if true in the abstract, the historical context suggests a deeper 
truth. An important task of legal theory, Professor Horwitz has written, “is 
to uncover the specific historical possibilities of legal conceptions—to ‘de-
code’ their true concrete meanings to historical situations.”175 In the context 
of Reconstruction, the right to nullify was not compatible with the Republi-
cans’ understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment and due process. 
  This paper provides evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment may have 
democratically constitutionalized the nineteenth-century precedent that dis-
allowed the Founding-era right to jury nullification. There is, in other 
words, a Fourteenth Amendment textual and originalist basis for not incor-
porating against the states the Sixth Amendment’s original right of nullifica-
tion, despite a general due process requirement of trial by jury. There is also 
an originalist basis for constitutionally disallowing the right of nullification 
in the federal courts too. This federal disallowance occurs by transforming, 
as Amar would like,176 the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s right to jury 
trial through the prism of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus eliminating 
its original right to nullify. The Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress’s 
power to enforce it, are thus read in light of the framers’ structural under-
standing of it, which was that the amendment and its enforcement legisla-
tion would or could empower federal courts to protect victims’ civil rights 
and similarly to prohibit jury nullification, notwithstanding any right to nul-
lify now superseded under a last-in-time rule that had been previously guar-
anteed in the Constitution.177 Since evidence for this federal disallowance 
comes from cases involving black and women victims, whether the framers’ 
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to provide a constitutional basis for 
prohibiting jury nullification in all cases, only in certain civil rights-type 
cases involving minority victims, or only in cases specified by Congress or 
under Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power remains an open question. 
  Contra Judge Weinstein, who apparently now considers the originalist 
Supreme Court to have restored nullification as a constitutional right, and 
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  174  See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991). 
  175 M ORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF THE 
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  176  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 
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Judge Middlebrooks, who believes that only restoring the right to nullify is 
consistent with originalism, this paper suggests that even originalist courts 
may use this Reconstruction-era originalism, grounded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Reconstruction-era history, as their rationale for preserving 
the disallowance of nullification. Founding-era history, in other words, may 
not exclusively dictate the Constitution’s original meaning. While Professor 
Bruce Ackerman called for a general “one-two” (Founding–Reconstruction) 
constitutional synthesis,178 and Professor Amar’s “refined incorporation” 
suggests which general rights in the original Bill, like the right of criminal 
jury trial, have been transformed,179 this analysis shows how the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s framers’ understanding may affect one significant, particular-
ized facet of that criminal jury trial right—the right to nullify. 
Other than Amar’s few-sentence hypothesis, from which he has dis-
tanced himself, the intersection of jury nullification constitutional doctrine 
and the Fourteenth Amendment has not been addressed in the scholarly lit-
erature. Historical studies on nineteenth-century nullification doctrine and 
the jury’s right to interpret the law do not address the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or the Reconstruction Congresses at all.180 Most recent works on the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning spend little time on jury law,181 
and the articles that do address Reconstruction and jury law general focus 
on the racial composition of juries.182 Looking at Reconstruction juries 
through purely race-colored lenses, however, may create a distorted picture 
of what the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers thought about nullification. 
For example, Professor James Forman’s recent Yale Law Journal article 
on nineteenth-century juries and race attempts to provide what is missing 
from some of the Supreme Court’s jury jurisprudence by discussing “how 
various parties during . . . Reconstruction . . . thought about juries.”183 Yet, 
this otherwise excellent article omits half of the story. Forman argues that in 
response to jury nullification by white Southerners, the Reconstruction Re-
publicans tried to “perfect” the jury principally “by providing for full black 
participation.”184 He finds “no proposals to restrict the Sixth Amendment 
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jury trial rights” and that “ideology—specifically, the longstanding com-
mitment to juries that had been enshrined during abolitionism—played a re-
straining influence and made it unthinkable to attempt to limit the power of 
even overtly hostile juries.”185 
This paper, on the other hand, finds that while part of the Republicans’ 
response was to include blacks on juries, the larger response to widespread 
nullification was to purge nullifiers from the jury boxes, whether they were 
whites in the Southern states in cases with black victims or Mormons in the 
Utah Territory in cases with women victims. Leading Republicans thought 
that those who indirectly counseled lawbreaking or even just believed that a 
federal criminal statute was unconstitutional were unfit to serve as jurors, 
and they advocated highly restrictive juror exclusion bills that would ex-
clude the majority of local populations in multiple regions from serving as 
jurors.186 In turn, their opposition repeatedly charged them with jury-
packing.187 Significantly, some Republicans went so far as to repudiate the 
right to nullify even in the abolitionist context.188 While Forman’s conclu-
sions may suggest that Republicans accepted the jury’s right to nullify as 
long as juries were racially representative of the population, this paper sug-
gests that the Republicans were so hostile to nullification that they would 
alter federal and constitutional law as well as reclassify their own abolition-
ist legacy to curtail it. 
Of course, deciphering the effect of the Due Process Clause on a provi-
sion of the Bill of Rights is a difficult task, particularly when assessing the 
Clause’s effect specifically on jury law. Section 1’s language is notoriously 
vague and ambiguous,189 and it mentions nothing explicitly about juries. Its 
legislative history provides little more assistance because most Congres-
sional debate on the Fourteenth Amendment addressed Sections 2 and 3, 
and the debates generally focused on practical questions of politics rather 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  185  Id. at 910 & n.81. 
  186  E.g., Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 5, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (excluding certain persons from jury ser-
vice in Ku Klux Klan Act prosecutions); H.R. 3097, 43d Cong. § 4 (1874) (excluding jurors who held 
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than on theoretical questions about the juristic meaning of the amendment’s 
provisions.190 No Congressional debates on the amendment, to my knowl-
edge, specifically addressed the jury’s law-deciding right or power. 
  The state ratification debates are also a dead end. “Reports of the de-
bates in the state legislatures on the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,” the second Justice Harlan once noted, “are not generally avail-
able.”191 Indeed, most of the state legislatures that considered the 
Fourteenth Amendment kept no record of their debates, or their discussion 
was so perfunctory that it does not shed light on their understanding of its 
meanings.192 The accounts that do survive are typically from newspaper 
sources that are not known for accuracy.193 Consequently, there are very 
few studies of the state ratification debates; none thoroughly explores the 
understandings of those politicians and citizens who participated in them,194 
and none explores their understandings of jury law at all. 
  Yet, determining how the Fourteenth Amendment affected the right to 
nullify is not an impossible task. The nullification practices in the federal 
and state courts during the Reconstruction Era suggest whether the jury’s 
right to nullify had eroded so dramatically that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would not have been understood to preserve that right. Reconstruction-era 
legal treatises and dictionaries suggest whether intelligent and informed 
Americans would have understood the right to jury trial still to include, as it 
did at the Founding, the right to nullify. Finally, there are Reconstruction-
era Congressional debates, recorded in the Congressional Globe and Con-
gressional Record, which are the principal source for almost all Fourteenth 
Amendment scholarship.195 
  I have reviewed, at least briefly, every use of the terms “juror/jurors” 
and “jury/juries” in these sources from the Thirty-ninth through the Forty-
third Congresses, which covers a period from December 1865 through 
March 1875. These terms were used on thousands of occasions,196 but most 
of these uses did not pertain to the nullification question. Some uses did not 
address the issue of nullification’s legitimacy directly but illustrated how the 
Reconstruction Congresses understood the right of trial by jury in relation to 
nullification. Other debates, however, especially those on federal responses 
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to nullification by white Southerners and by Mormon Utahns, showed what 
leading Republicans thought should be done with nullifiers—and thus what 
they understood the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize or even to re-
quire—they wanted these prospective jurors purged. 
  In using the Congressional debates as evidence, this paper draws upon 
the model of Judge McConnell’s scholarship, which has used Reconstruc-
tion-era Congressional debates to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
original meaning.197 Judge McConnell offers two justifications for why 
these Congressional debates are particularly appropriate evidence for Four-
teenth Amendment interpretation. First, Reconstruction-era Congressional 
debates were conducted, often in constitutional terms, by officers sworn to 
uphold the Constitution.198 Second,  
far more than other amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment was a Congres-
sional creation. The states and the people exercised little control. The state rati-
fication debates did not dwell on the details of the proposed Amendment, and—
an important point—the margin of victory for the Amendment was attained by 
coercion of the Southern states rather than by winning the support of the elec-
torate in three-fourths of the States. When an Amendment obtains its superma-
jority through Congressional exercise of its power to condition readmission of 
states to the Union, it is a fiction to treat the opinions of the people of the vari-
ous states as controlling; it is Congress that effectively exercised the amendatory 
power.199 
  Judge McConnell also explains why it is appropriate to look at the de-
bates not only of the Thirty-ninth Congress but also of the next four Con-
gresses, which takes my research to March 1875. While the Thirty-ninth 
Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction Con-
gresses were forced to determine what it meant, so their actions provide 
evidence of the original understandings of its requirements and limita-
tions.200 Furthermore, Judge McConnell finds much to support a claim of 
continuity between 1868 and 1875. The Reconstruction Era is understood 
by historians as “a distinct political era in which a particular political fac-
tion, with a particular political and constitutional agenda, dominated the 
federal government and pursued a consistent and coherent program.”201 
Many of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers in Congress remained in 
power through 1875; the Republicans held a strong majority in both Houses 
of Congress until March 1875, when, on the heels of the Election of 1874, 
their 199–88 advantage in the House of Representatives declined into a 
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182–103 deficit.202 Finally, many of the issues and arguments in Congress 
were similar throughout the period. The Congressional debates, federal en-
actments, and other Reconstruction-era sources may illustrate the Four-
teenth Amendment process through which the United States experienced a 
constitutional criminal procedure revolution—one grounded in protecting 
the rights of blacks and women—that refined the Bill of Rights. 
III. NON-INCORPORATION OF THE RIGHT TO NULLIFY 
Originalists, like Professor Berger, and those who consider themselves 
obligated to follow the Supreme Court’s originalism, like Judge Weinstein, 
use Founding-era history to contend that the jury’s right to nullify is of con-
stitutional dimension, inherent in Article III and the Sixth Amendment, and 
must be restored.203 They argue that the nineteenth-century judiciary’s dis-
allowance of that right was unconstitutional—just as unconstitutional as the 
recently overturned sentencing statutes that the Court determined violated 
the jury’s constitutional prerogative to pass judgment upon every element of 
an offense. This paper does not dispute that, under an originalist regime, 
those nineteenth-century anti-nullification decisions may be unconstitu-
tional and thus overturned—unless there was a subsequent constitutional 
amendment relating to due process and jury rights that constitutionalized the 
once-unconstitutional decisions. The Fourteenth may be that amendment. 
But in relation to juries and nullification, what is that amendment’s 
original meaning? Does the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning—
either in itself or through incorporation of the Sixth Amendment—protect 
the right to nullify, like Article III and the Sixth Amendment originally did? 
To answer these questions, we must use Reconstruction-era originalism to 
determine what the meaning of criminal trial by jury was in 1868. 
If the Fourteenth Amendments’ framers, ratifiers, original interpreters, 
and original enforcers did not understand due process or the right of jury by 
definition to encompass the right to nullify, then an originalist should be 
hard-pressed to contend that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning 
protects or incorporates nullification. On the contrary, if their understanding 
was that nullification was antithetical to the meaning of trial by jury, then an 
originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment should not protect or in-
corporate the right to nullify. This Part answers these conjectures affirma-
tively. Contra Professor Burger and originalists who seek to apply the right 
to nullify to the states, Reconstruction-era originalism provides an original-
ist argument that the Fourteenth Amendment neither protects nor incorpo-
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rates the jury’s right to nullify. 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Criminal Jury Trial 
Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment is relevant to jury nullification 
only if it relates to the rights of criminal jury trials. Absent such a relation-
ship, the Fourteenth Amendment could neither protect nor incorporate the 
right to jury and thus the right to nullify—but it could not plausibly trans-
form or supersede the Sixth Amendment’s original meaning either.204 The 
term “jury” nowhere appears in the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, if the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to criminal jury trial, it must do so 
implicitly, just as the Article III and Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury 
trial implicitly protected the jury’s right to nullify at the Founding. 
For our purposes, both originalist scholars and those who oppose restor-
ing the right to nullify concur that the Fourteenth Amendment should be un-
derstood to protect directly or to incorporate the right of criminal jury trial. 
When Professor Burger called for a restoration of the jury’s right to nullify 
based on the original Constitution, for example, he did not distinguish be-
tween federal and state cases. The Supreme Court, ever since Duncan v. 
Louisiana, has also agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
right to criminal trial by jury. Importantly, the contemporary Supreme 
Court’s originalist criminal procedure jurisprudence has emphasized the 
fundamentality of the jury to due process.205 
It is worth noting, though, that the Court did not find the right implicit in 
the Fourteenth Amendment until a full century after 1868. “Trial by jury” 
the Court held in 1900, “has never been affirmed to be a necessary requisite 
of due process of law.”206 Indeed, the dissenters in Duncan pointed to many 
cases where the Court had previously stated that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not require trial by jury.207 From a nineteenth-century originalist per-
spective, though, there are substantial reasons for understanding Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to require trial by jury. The incorporation and 
other debates have been played out in the literature,208 so a short sketch 
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here should suffice. 
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To begin, Section 1 unambiguously requires state judicial proceedings to 
observe “due process of law,”209 and the preponderance of the evidence 
suggests that the Reconstruction-era meaning of “due process” implicitly 
included a right to criminal jury trial. Addressing the specific requirements 
of “due process” a few years after Reconstruction, the leading nineteenth-
century constitutional treatise writer, Thomas Cooley, wrote that it man-
dated “prosecution according to the forms of law, resulting in conviction af-
ter public trial, and opportunity to be heard, and followed by judgment ap-
plying the law which the convicted party violated.”210 In explaining what a 
criminal “trial” entailed, he said that although some states did not allow jury 
trials for minor offenses, “in general . . . an accused person will be entitled 
to the judgment of his peers.”211 He was more explicit when writing in 
1868, shortly before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. “The trial of 
the guilt or innocence of the accused,” he declared, “must be by jury,” an 
American principle that he noted dated back to the earliest extant Plymouth 
Colony legislation.212 Cooley also described due process by referring to 
William Blackstone’s discussion of the Magna Charta as authoritative.213 In 
another passage, Blackstone had written that the “trial by jury, . . . as the 
grand bulwark of [every Englishman’s] liberties, is secured to him by the 
great charter” in its textual precursor to due process.214 
Antebellum authors agreed that due process required criminal trial by 
jury. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, wrote that the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause “in effect affirms the right of trial according to the 
process and proceedings of the common law,”215 which included criminal 
jury trial. “[N]o lawyer in this country or England, who is worthy of the ap-
pellation,” Alvan Stewart, a leading source of Reconstruction-era Republi-
can ideology, similarly chimed, “will deny that the true and only meaning of 
the phrase, ‘due process of law,’” includes “a trial by a petit jury of twelve 
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (arguing that selective incorporation lacks historical 
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OF AMERICA 298 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1880). 
  211  Id. at 225. 
  212 C OOLEY, supra note 42, at 319 & n.1 (“All that extant of the legislation of the Plymouth Colony 
for the first five years consists of the single regulation, ‘that all criminal facts . . . shall be tried by the 
verdict of twelve honest men, to be impanelled by authority in form of a jury, upon their oath.’”). 
  213  Id. at 351 (citing Magna Charta, ch. 29 (1215)). 
  214 4  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349–50 (1765). 
  215 3  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1783, at 661 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).  
April 2009  RECONSTRUCTION AND JURY NULLIFICATION 38 
men, and a judgment pronounced on the finding of the jury, by a court.”216 
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause thus serves as a direct tex-
tual basis for requiring states to comply with the right to trial by jury. 
In addition to direct application of due process, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment also mandates criminal trial by jury through incorporation or its alter-
native. The alternative, anti-incorporation theory of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is that Section 1 was understood to protect only certain limited natural 
rights common to all free government, rather than specific guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights.217 Among the natural rights understood to exist in 1868 was 
the right of criminal trial by jury. For example, Senator George Edmunds 
said that “under a civil government” trial by jury “of course is the only 
method of punishing crime.”218 Moreover, General Winfield Hancock, upon 
assuming command of the military district that included Texas and Louisi-
ana, issued the following order to protect rights in his district: “[T]he great 
principles of American liberty are still the lawful inheritance of this people, 
and ever should be. The right of trial by jury, the habeas corpus, the liberty 
of the press, the freedom of speech, the natural rights of persons, and the 
rights of property must be preserved.”219 The right of trial by jury was the 
first of those rights he listed. Even academic foes of incorporation, unlike 
the dissenters in Duncan, argue that while the Fourteenth Amendment was 
not understood to mandate all of the criminal procedure rights enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights, it was understood to require states to provide a fair 
process for deciding criminal cases, which included a “jury trial right.”220 
The strongest originalist case for a Fourteenth Amendment right to 
criminal jury trial, though, comes through incorporation of the Sixth 
Amendment’s explicit jury clause. Professors Amar and Michael Curtis 
have marshaled much evidence that the Reconstruction Congresses under-
stood the Fourteenth Amendment to make the Sixth Amendment right to 
jury trial binding on the states.221 In addition to their discussion of more 
than thirty statements advocating general incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 
Republicans spearheading the amendment specifically understood incorpo-
ration to include the right of criminal jury trial. Since the right of criminal 
jury trials was among those being violated in the South in 1866, Republi-
cans especially wanted to give constitutional sanction to states’ obligation to 
guarantee the right of criminal jury trial.222 Introducing the amendment to 
his colleagues, Senator Jacob Howard reported that among the fundamental 
guarantees made binding upon the states would be the “right of an accused 
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person . . . to be tried by an impartial jury.”223 After ratification, Senator 
John Sherman reported that the “right to be tried by an impartial jury is one 
of the privileges included in the fourteenth amendment; and no State can 
deprive any one by a State law of this impartial trial by jury.”224 
This guarantee, moreover, was not among the more controversial re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. As George Paschal’s 1868 trea-
tise noted, most of the states already had adopted similar jury rights provi-
sions in their own constitutions.225 Indeed, the right to criminal jury trial for 
serious crimes was recognized, according to one count, in the constitutions 
of at least twenty-five of the twenty-seven states ratifying the amend-
ment.226 Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers understood their 
amendment to provide a federal guarantee, whether directly through due 
process or natural rights theory or indirectly through incorporation, of the 
long-established right to criminal trial by jury. 
But how did they define the term? Did they, like the Founders who rati-
fied the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment, understand the right to 
criminal jury to encompass, as a necessary component, the jury’s right to 
nullify? Or, despite the protection or incorporation of the right to jury trial, 
was the right to nullify not protected or incorporated along with it? 
B. The Right to Nullify in Reconstruction-era Courts 
For the Founding Era, one measure for determining whether the existing 
conception of jury entailed nullification was to look at the practices of fed-
eral and state courts. In the late eighteenth century, the universal, or virtu-
ally universal, practice in courts was to allow criminal juries to determine 
law as well as fact. Founding-era judges, lawyers, and, importantly, jurors—
jury service being the means by which many of the intelligent and informed 
Americans who participated in the constitutional ratification process learned 
about rights and the legal system227—thus experienced the constitutional 
right of jury trial as encompassing by definition the jury’s right to decide 
questions of law and to nullify. Because of the antebellum judicial disallow-
ance of nullification, however, this practice of submitting legal questions to 
the jury was not universal during Reconstruction. On the other hand, the 
practice had not been disallowed everywhere either. While jury practices in 
the Reconstruction-era courts cannot definitely tell us the understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers, ratifiers, interpreters, and enforcers, 
these practices nonetheless offer us some clues as to what Fourteenth 
Amendment due process and its right to criminal jury trial originally meant. 
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In the federal courts, the Supreme Court did not disallow nullification 
until the Sparf decision in 1895, a full generation after Reconstruction. 
Since the 1830s, however, lower courts, often with Supreme Court Justices 
sitting on circuit, had consistently instructed jurors that they had no right to 
nullify. By 1868, the federal courts in Philadelphia, Boston, the District of 
Columbia, San Francisco, and New York had denied that the Constitution’s 
guarantee of the right to trial by jury bestowed on the jury a right to deter-
mine law as well as fact.228 Other federal judges considered these prece-
dents persuasive, though perhaps not binding. For example, in 1851, sitting 
in the same court in which Justice Story had decided Battiste sixteen years 
earlier, Justice Curtis noted that “Justice Story pronounced an opinion on 
this question” of nullification. “He denied that this right existed, and gave 
reasons for the denial of exceeding weight and force.” Although Justice 
Curtis noted his agreement with Justice Story, he still proceeded to answer 
the question independently, conducting his own originalist analysis of 
Founding-era history. “I conclude, then,” he wrote: 
that when the constitution of the United States was founded, it was a settled rule 
of the common law that, in criminal as well as civil cases, the court decided the 
law, and the jury the facts; and it cannot be doubted that this must have an im-
portant effect in determining what is meant by the constitution when it adopts 
trial by jury.229 
Although Justice Curtis’s originalist history was, as we saw above, incorrect 
and thus his opinion may have little persuasive authority today, his opinion 
and those of his colleagues on the federal bench suggest that by 1868 the 
practice in the lower federal courts, and particularly those in the most sig-
nificant cities, was not to allow the jury to decide questions of law.230 
State court practices, however, were more mixed. In 1857, Francis 
Wharton counted eleven states that “unite in the doctrine that the jury must 
take the law from the court” and five states that held the opposite view;231 
he said nothing about the law in the remaining fifteen. In 1876, John Prof-
fatt attempted a similar state-by-state assessment. He found that thirteen 
states prohibited nullification, six allowed it, and five had unclear or con-
flicting rules;232 he did not address the other thirteen states. A half-century 
later, Professor Howe, reviewing a dozen states, wrote that six had disal-
lowed nullification by 1871 but that the other half allowed it for at least an-
other decade or even quarter-century.233 In addition to the lack of uniform-
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ity among the states, there is the additional problem that Wharton, Proffatt, 
and Howe occasionally assessed state practices differently despite reading 
the same or similar precedents. In Pennsylvania’s case, Wharton deemed the 
state anti-nullification by 1857; Proffatt put it in the uncertain camp in 
1876; and Howe considered Pennsylvania pro-nullification until 1891. 
This example, of course, contradicts the one certainty upon which Whar-
ton, Proffatt, Howe, and modern scholars universally concur: during the 
nineteenth century, the clear and overwhelming judicial trend, in both fed-
eral and state courts, was to disallow nullification. They agree that on the 
eve of Reconstruction, at least with respect to the judiciary, the growing 
weight of authority was that that the meaning of the right to jury no longer 
encompassed the jury’s right to nullify. Yet, a mere judicial trend does not 
establish whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers’ conception of jury 
trial included the right to nullify. 
First, a trend shows direction but not universal practice, as Wharton, 
Proffatt and Howe demonstrated. During Reconstruction, many state courts 
still considered nullification a right, even as judges implicitly or expressly 
vented their disapproval. In a Connecticut case from 1873, for example, the 
state supreme court approved of a trial court that had submitted the constitu-
tional question of whether a state liquor statute was constitutional to the jury 
while simultaneously informing the jury that the supreme court, in a previ-
ous case, had held the statute valid, presumably desiring the jury to follow 
that precedent.234 In a Tennessee case from 1874, the state supreme court, 
notwithstanding a long three-judge dissenting opinion asserting that nullifi-
cation was “wrong, and unsupported by the constitution, or sound principles 
of law and policy,”235 acknowledged that criminal juries had the right to 
judge the law. According to Howe, in Pennsylvania, Vermont, Connecticut, 
and, of course, the U.S. Supreme Court, the judiciary did not disallow nulli-
fication until a full generation after Reconstruction. 
Second, a judicial trend shows only what the judiciary thought the jury 
right entailed, and, just as antebellum state legislatures clashed with the 
courts, so too did Reconstruction-era state legislatures. After the Georgia 
Supreme Court held, in 1870, that the jury must accept the law from the 
court,236 the state passed a constitutional amendment (subsequently ignored 
by the judiciary) providing that the jury “in all criminal cases, shall be 
judges of the law and the facts.”237 Likewise, after the Louisiana Supreme 
Court began curtailing the jury’s right to nullify in 1871,238 and its chief 
justice even called nullification a “legal heresy” and “moral wrong,”239 the 
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state constitution was amended to provide that “the jury in all criminal cases 
shall be the judges of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or in-
nocence . . . .”240 Although these were former Confederate states, during the 
1850s, the Maryland, Indiana, and Massachusetts state legislatures or con-
stitutional conventions also tried to preserve the nullification right from 
what they considered undemocratic judicial usurpation. 
Congress, not the states, however, was the driving force behind the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its original meaning,241 so what matters most is 
how Congress understood the jury’s right to decide questions of law. If 
Congress conclusively believed that due process and the right to jury trial 
did not include the right to nullify, then, under an originalist jurisprudence, 
the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the original Sixth Amendment, should 
not be read to protect the jury’s right to nullify, either through incorporation 
or otherwise. Thus, the critical question is whether, in guaranteeing the right 
of trial by jury through the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress thought that 
“jury” meant a body of citizens permitted to decide both fact and law. The 
legal treatises from which Congress was likely to draw its understanding of 
the jury and which illustrate how intelligent and informed Americans ratify-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment understood the jury, in addition to the words 
spoken in the Reconstruction Congresses, show that Congress did not un-
derstand the criminal jury right to include the jury’s right to nullify. 
C. The New Original Meaning in Treatises and Dictionaries 
  Discussion of what intelligent and informed Americans understood the 
jury’s role to be during the Reconstruction Era must begin with Francis 
Wharton and Thomas Cooley, the two great nineteenth-century American 
treatise writers. Both defined today by the word “influential,”242 Wharton 
and Cooley wrote about the jury’s law-finding right during the late antebel-
lum and Reconstruction eras. Wharton, a Pennsylvania Democrat, published 
the fourth edition of A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States in 
1857, less than a decade before the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted. 
Cooley, a Michigan Republican, published the first edition of A Treatise on 
Constitutional Limitations in 1868, the very year that the amendment was 
ratified. In addition to these treatises, another classic, John Proffatt’s A Trea-
tise on Trial by Jury, published in 1876, illuminates jury rights and duties 
during the Reconstruction Era. Although Wharton was the most emphatic in 
his assertion, he, Cooley, and Proffatt all agreed that, according to the then-
existing state of the law, juries no longer had the right to nullify and instead 
had to take the law from the court. 
  Wharton, a Yale-educated lawyer, began his career as a state prosecutor, 
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which led him to write on criminal law and to compose practical legal trea-
tises. The first edition of his Treatise on Criminal Law was published in 
1846, and he revised it many times throughout the century. As a young 
prosecutor in 1845, Wharton had benefited from a state judge’s instruction 
that it was the jury’s duty “to receive the law for the purposes of this trial 
from the court,”243 notwithstanding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
did not mandate this rule until a half-century later.244 As a treatise writer, 
Wharton paid special attention to the jury’s right to decide the law; the 
fourth edition, for example, contained over ten pages on the subject.245 
  His firm conclusion was that juries had no right to decide the law. 
“When a case is on trial,” he wrote, “the great weight of authority now is 
that the jury are to receive as binding on their consciences the law laid down 
by the court.” He conceded that the jury had the power to nullify because an 
acquitted defendant could not be retried in spite of the evidence. Neverthe-
less, “this exception arises,” he insisted, “not from the doctrine sometimes 
broached that the jury are the judges of the law in criminal cases, but from 
the fundamental policy of the common law which forbids a man when once 
acquitted to be put on a second trial for the same offence.” Aside from this 
lone exception, though, it could be “hardly doubted in any quarter” that 
judges, as the only rightful law-deciders, must set aside verdicts that contra-
dicted the law.246 
  Wharton understood that during the Founding Era the jury had the right 
to nullify. “For some time after the adoption of the federal constitution,” he 
acknowledged, “a contrary doctrine, it is true, was generally received.” Yet, 
he continued, “[I]t was not long before it was found necessary, if not en-
tirely to abandon the rule, at least practically to ignore it.” The problem was 
that if “juries have any moral right to construe the law,” there could be no 
settled law because juries’ notions on fundamental questions varied and ju-
ries could not bind one another on interpretations of the law. 
[I]n practice, however speciously the doctrine may be asserted, it is, except so 
far as it may sometimes lead a jury to acquit in a case where the facts demand a 
conviction, practically repudiated, and since its only operation now is mischie-
vous, it is time it should be rejected in theory as well as reality. For independ-
ently of the reasons already mentioned an attempt to carry it out in practice, 
would involve a trial in endless absurdity.247 
  Wharton approved of Supreme Court Justices riding circuit who had 
held that it was a good cause of preemptory challenge that a juror differed 
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from the court in his view of the constitutionality of the statute on which the 
prosecution resisted. Not only were such challenges normatively acceptable 
to Wharton and the Justices, but also they illustrated that jurors no longer 
had any law-finding right. “On the assumption that the jury as the judges of 
the law as well as the court,” he remarked, “there is no more reason a priori 
that the court should set aside a juror, than that the jury should set aside the 
judge,”248 an obvious absurdity. Wharton made it clear that in his influential 
treatise, the meaning of “jury” did not entail the jury’s right to nullify. On 
the contrary, he believed at least a decade before Reconstruction that nullifi-
cation was antithetical to a legitimate system of jury trial. 
  Thomas Cooley did not disagree, though he was more cautious than 
Wharton had been. Appointed the University of Michigan Law School’s 
first dean in 1859 and elected to the Michigan Supreme Court in 1864, Coo-
ley established himself as perhaps the nation’s leading constitutional scholar 
with the publication of his “landmark”249 and “brilliantly crafted”250  Trea-
tise on Constitutional Limitations, the most important of his many works.251 
The treatise appeared while states were ratifying the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, making it among the best sources for determining the original mean-
ing of “jury” rights implicit within the Fourteenth Amendment and thus of 
the jury’s right to nullify. 
  “[I]t is still an important question,” Cooley began his four-page discus-
sion of nullification, 
whether the jury are bound to receive and act upon the law as given to them by 
the judge, or whether, on the other hand, his opinion is advisory only, so that 
they are at liberty to follow it if it accords with their own convictions, or to dis-
regard it if it does not.252 
He considered the issue complicated because when the jury acquits on the 
law and against the evidence, the acquittal is final, so it appears that the jury 
is the judge of the law, but when the jury convicts on the law against the 
evidence, the judge sets aside the verdict, which suggests that the jury may 
not judge the law. Nonetheless, he continued: 
it is clear that the jury are no more the judges of the law when they acquit than 
when they condemn, and the different result in the two cases arises from the 
merciful maxim in the common law, which will not suffer an accused party to be 
put twice in jeopardy, however erroneous may have been the first acquittal.253 
  This led Cooley to reason that “the rule of law would seem to be, that it 
is the duty of the jury to receive and follow the law as delivered to them by 
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the court,” though, of course, “the jury have the complete power to disre-
gard it.” Thus, Cooley concluded that jury had the power but not the right to 
decide questions of law, and he added that although there were opposing de-
cisions, “the current of authority” supported his conclusion.254 
  Both Wharton and Cooley informed their readers that the jury had the 
power yet not the right to nullify. They insisted that the jury’s ability to ac-
quit against the evidence and the court’s corresponding inability to overturn 
acquittals against the law was grounded only in the double jeopardy protec-
tion—not in any law-finding right of the jury. That right, according to their 
understanding, no longer existed by the Reconstruction Era. In 1868, intelli-
gent and informed Americans, like the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers, 
would not have understood the right to criminal jury trial to encompass the 
jury’s right to nullify. 
  Although John Proffatt’s Treatise on Trial by Jury was not published un-
til 1876, after the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified, it too illustrates 
the understanding of the right to jury during the Reconstruction Era. Proffatt 
was a prominent San Franciscan lawyer who authored or edited several le-
gal works, including a many-volume series of the most important state court 
decisions since the Founding.255 He called his Treatise on Trial by Jury “the 
first attempt” in American legal scholarship “to give the law applicable to 
all proceedings connected with the jury,”256 and it naturally devoted much 
attention to the state of the law surrounding the jury’s law-finding power. 
  Proffatt opened his discussion by acknowledging that “there is a wide 
divergence of opinion.”257 “In many places,” he continued, “it has been 
claimed for the jury that they may rightfully disregard the instructions of the 
court in matters of law” so that “they are the ultimate, rightful and para-
mount judges of the law as well as the facts in criminal cases.” Even “a 
multitude of authorities, of old and recent date, of very respectable weight 
and learning” supported this assertion of a jury’s right to nullify.258 Proffatt, 
however, disagreed with those authorities and did not believe that they rep-
resented the state of American law during Reconstruction. 
  While he conceded that “the jury in criminal cases have the power, 
which is often too freely exercised to decide upon the law in criminal 
cases,” Proffatt added that “if the question be as to their right to decide the 
law, it is an entirely different matter. It may be safely asserted that in a large 
majority of our States this right is denied.” Like Wharton, Proffatt acknowl-
edged that nullification doctrine was popular during at the Founding but had 
been discarded during the antebellum era. He also agreed that the disallow-
ance of nullification was not just a descriptive fait accompli by Reconstruc-
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tion but also a normatively justifiable policy. “It is well this view was estab-
lished,” he wrote, “for under the former doctrine there could be no stability 
or uniformity in the law.” Mirroring Wharton and Cooley, his ultimate con-
clusion was that the “preponderance of judicial authority in this country is 
in favor of the doctrine that the jury should take the law from the court and 
apply it to the evidence under its direction.”259 
  Nor were Reconstruction-era scholars the only ones to understand the 
jury as a fact-finding, but not law-deciding, body. Like the legal treatises, 
dictionaries also illustrate that, by Reconstruction, the understanding of the 
right to criminal jury trial did not include the jury’s right to nullify. For ex-
ample, one dictionary of the Constitution, intended for laymen, defined 
“jury” as a body of men selected “to try questions of fact in civil and crimi-
nal suits, and who are under oath or solemn affirmation to decide the facts 
truly and faithfully, according to the evidence laid before them.”260 It drew 
no distinction between civil and criminal cases; even criminal juries tried 
only questions of fact. 
  The leading nineteenth-century American dictionary provides even more 
conclusive evidence.261 Noah Webster, a Yale-educated lawyer like Whar-
ton, first published his American Dictionary of the English Language in 
1828. In this first edition’s definition of “jury,” Webster noted, “Petty juries, 
consisting usually of twelve men, attend courts to try matters of fact in civil 
causes, and to decide both the law and the fact in criminal prosecutions.”262 
This definition of jury thus included the criminal jury’s right to decide the 
law, affirming the jury’s right to nullify. After Webster died in 1843, George 
and Charles Merriam acquired the rights to Webster’s Dictionary and hired 
Webster’s son-in-law Chauncey A. Goodrich, a Yale alumnus and professor 
of rhetoric, to oversee new editions. In the 1857 revised and enlarged edi-
tion, current when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, no distinction 
was drawn between civil and criminal juries, and no mention was made of 
any jury’s law-deciding right. A “jury” was defined as: 
A number of freeholders, selected in the manner prescribed by law, impaneled 
and sworn to inquire into and try any matter of fact, and to declare the truth on 
the evidence given them in the case.—Juries are of two kinds, grand and petty 
or petit. The office of . . . the latter is to try causes, both civil and criminal.263 
  Between 1828 and 1857, therefore, the Dictionary understood the mean-
ing of jury to have changed from one in which criminal juries—by defini-
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tion—decided questions of fact and law to one in which law-deciding was 
not inherent in the meaning of any jury. Indeed, juries were to “try any mat-
ter of fact” and “to declare the truth on the evidence,” not the law. Diction-
ary definitions do not change lightly, so the 1857 edition provides evidence 
that the meaning of “jury” had evolved. Goodrich was not law-trained him-
self, but he understood the significance of precise legal definitions. In his 
preface, he wrote that his father Elizur Goodrich, a Yale trained-lawyer and 
former Yale law professor, reviewed and corrected the definitions on law.264 
  Wharton, Cooley, Proffatt, and Webster’s Dictionary concurred: the 
jury’s right to nullify, inherent in the meaning of “jury” in the Founding Era, 
was largely incompatible with the meaning of “jury” by Reconstruction. 
These sources suggest that informed Americans in 1868 would not have un-
derstood the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the jury right’s to nullify ei-
ther through incorporation or through its own Section 1 language. Members 
of the Reconstruction Congresses were likely familiar with Wharton, Coo-
ley, and Webster’s Dictionary, but we cannot rely on these sources alone. 
Although they may have shaped the members’ governing view, the Recon-
struction Congresses were more concerned with other issues—like civil 
rights—than what elite lawyers like the treatise writers thought. To deter-
mine how they viewed jury nullification, we must turn to their own words. 
D. The New Original Meaning in the Reconstruction Congresses 
The words of the members of Congress who spoke about jury nullifica-
tion agreed with the treatises and dictionaries of their time. Given the total-
ity of the Reconstruction-era Congressional debates, the evidence shows 
that most members of Congress, and particularly the Republican leaders 
who designed the Fourteenth Amendment’s agenda, understood the right to 
criminal jury trial not to include the jury’s right to nullify, and therefore they 
would not have understood the Fourteenth Amendment to protect directly or 
to incorporate a protection of nullification. The jury-based analogies they 
invoked in their debates, the bills relating to jury service they proposed, and 
the state-court jury practices they discussed show almost no support for a 
constitutional right to nullify and much antagonism against it. Although the 
principal Republicans who framed the Fourteenth Amendment, Representa-
tive John Bingham, a Moderate Republican from Ohio, Representative 
Thaddeus Stevens, a Radical Republican from Pennsylvania, and Senator 
Jacob Howard, a Radical from Michigan,265 did not make any statements 
during the Reconstruction Congresses relating specifically to the jury’s right 
to nullify, we have statements from other leading Republicans who played 
instrumental roles in framing the Reconstruction amendments and their en-
forcement legislation, including Senators Lyman Trumbull, Charles Sumner, 
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Frederick Theodore Frelinghuysen, and William Morris Stewart. 
  Senator Trumbull, a Moderate Republican from Illinois, is naturally im-
portant to our determination of the Reconstruction Congresses’ understand-
ing of nullification. He chaired the influential Judiciary Committee, co-
authored the Thirteenth Amendment, and authored the Freedmen’s Bureau 
Act and Civil Rights Act of 1866, which the Fourteenth Amendment was 
intended to constitutionalize. By February 1866, Republicans in the Thirty-
ninth Congress had united in supporting his two bills as necessary amend-
ments to the Johnson Administration’s Presidential Reconstruction, viewing 
them as a prelude to readmitting the South to Congressional representa-
tion.266 Much to the surprise of Congress, though, President Johnson vetoed 
the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill because, among other reasons, he did not think 
Reconstruction matters should be decided while eleven states remained un-
represented in Congress.267 In his veto message, he asserted that Congress 
did not have the constitutional “right to shut out, in time of peace, any State 
from the representation to which it is entitled by the Constitution.”268 Un-
shaken by Johnson, the House of Representatives responded with a resolu-
tion, for which it asked the Senate’s concurrence, that “no Senator or Repre-
sentative shall be admitted into either branch of Congress from any of the 
[former Confederate] States until Congress shall have declared such States 
entitled to such representation.”269 
  The Senate concurred but not before acrimonious debate.270 Among 
those who objected was James Dixon of Connecticut, an outspoken sup-
porter of Johnson who had been elected to the Senate as a Republican but 
would run unsuccessfully for reelection as a Democrat in 1868.271 Dixon 
agreed with Johnson that each House of Congress could judge the particular 
qualifications of its own individual members yet could not outright disqual-
ify an entire state.272 Trumbull, who supported the House’s resolution, 
countered that while each House could judge individual qualifications, the 
entire Congress could determine which states were qualified to send mem-
bers to Congress. Congress could disqualify a state if, for example, its legis-
lature swore allegiance to the new emperor of Mexico.273 When Dixon re-
sponded that, in spite of Congress, the Senate could still admit a member 
chosen by a treacherous state, Trumbull replied: 
If the Senator means to ask me if the Senate has not the physical power to admit 
anybody, elected or not, I admit they have the same right to do it that twelve ju-
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rymen would have, against the sworn and uncontradicted testimony of a hun-
dred witnesses, to bring in a verdict directly against the evidence, and perjure 
themselves. I suppose we have the physical power to commit perjury here when 
we have sworn to support the Constitution. We might admit a man here from 
Pennsylvanian avenue, elected by nobody, as a member of this Senate; but we 
would commit perjury in doing it, and have no right to do it.274 
Trumbull, in other words, understood the jury to have the power to bring a 
verdict directly against the evidence but to have no right to do so. He recog-
nized no exception or right for jury nullification. Jurors deciding cases were 
analogous to senators who had sworn to uphold the Constitution; acting 
contrary to the law was perjury. 
  On the nullification question, even those on opposite side of the political 
spectrum appeared to have agreed with Trumbull. Years later, Senator Au-
gustus Summerfield Merrimon of North Carolina, known as one of the most 
partisan Democrats in Congress, favored the 1874 amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1867,275 which offered concessions to debtors. He desired, for 
example, to increase the necessary debt for federal courts to have jurisdic-
tion over bankruptcy cases. When Senator George Edmunds of Vermont ob-
jected that state juries were more prejudiced against creditors and more 
likely to find verdicts against the law, Merrimon countered: 
[E]very juror in the State courts, every juror sitting in a State court as much as if 
he were sitting in a Federal court, is bound by the Constitution and laws of the 
Union. They are bound by their oaths to support and execute these laws; and the 
same obligation that rests upon them in the Federal courts rests upon them in the 
State courts. . . . [T]he judge charges them as to the law and their duties . . . .276 
Although bankruptcy cases were civil cases, Merrimon’s statement suggests 
that he believed all juries, including criminal ones, were required to reach 
verdicts based on only the facts and not the law. Like Trumbull’s senators, 
juries, Merrimon reasoned, were bound by oath to support the Constitution 
and the laws of the United States, which meant that they must follow the 
law as charged by the judge. Like Trumbull, Merrimon recognized no right 
of nullification. 
In addition to Trumbull, Senator Sumner of Massachusetts is an appro-
priate figure by which the measure the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning to 
the Reconstruction Congresses’ Republicans. True, Sumner was a Radical to 
the left of more mainstream Republicans like Trumbull, and, though voting 
for it, he also criticized the Fourteenth Amendment because he considered 
Section 2’s acknowledgement that states could limit suffrage on racial 
grounds, a “compromise with wrong.”277 Nevertheless, he was also among 
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the leaders of Congressional Reconstruction, his proposed alternative to the 
Thirteenth Amendment was a precursor to Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and his Civil Rights Bill to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
finally won his Senate colleagues’ approval in 1874 and passed the House, 
in amended form, the following year.278 Sumner, in short, was among those 
senators who represented the Fourteenth Amendment’s rights-protecting 
agenda and thus shines light on whether the Due Process Clause’s meaning 
included the jury’s right to nullify. 
Like Trumbull and Merrimon, Sumner disputed the validity of nullifica-
tion. His first statement to that effect came in July 1867. In January, the 
Thirty-ninth Congress, approaching its final adjournment still dismayed by 
the Johnson Administration’s Reconstruction policies, had passed an act to 
establish an “extra” First Session of the Fortieth Congress to meet in July 
(instead of December). Radicals, like Sumner, hoped to remain in session 
throughout the summer so that Congress could continue overseeing John-
son’s actions. Moderates, though, wanted the extra session only to pass new 
legislation preventing Johnson from defeating what they had already ac-
complished.279 Therefore, Moderates proposed to confine the First Ses-
sion’s business to “removing the obstructions” in the way of Congress’s Re-
construction acts and to forbid any further legislation in the session.280 
When Sumner objected to this resolution, claiming that the Senate had the 
constitutional duty to attend to all public business whenever it was in ses-
sion, which would lead to a longer session, William Pitt Fessenden, a Mod-
erate from Maine, insisted that the Senate had the constitutional authority to 
confine its business whenever the majority so desired. Sumner responded: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
[Senator Fessenden] will pardon me for saying that he confounds right and 
power. Unquestionably the Senate has the power which the Senator from Maine 
attributes to it; but it has not the right. A jury, as we know according to familiar 
illustration, in giving the general verdict has the power to say “guilty” or “not 
guilty,” and disregard the instructions of the court, but I need not say that it is a 
grave question among lawyers whether it has the right. Now, I submit that as-
suming that the Senate has the power which the Senator from Maine claims for 
it, it has not the right. It has not the right to disregard the spirit of the Constitu-
tion; and the proposition now before you is of that character.281 
In this instance, with forty percent of the senators absent, Moderates 
prevailed, the Senate debated only the limited Reconstruction measures, and 
Congress adjourned within three weeks.282 What is important for our pur-
poses, however, is the analogy in Sumner’s argument. Although he called 
the jury’s right to decide questions of law “a grave question among law-
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yers,” rather than a settled one, Sumner indicated that he did not believe in 
the right, and he implied that other senators would find persuasive his right-
power analogy to nullification. He would have had no reason to illustrate his 
right-power constitutional objection to the Moderates’ resolution with the 
nullification example unless he thought that nullification, like the resolution, 
was only an illegitimate power and not a constitutional right. According to 
Sumner, then, the jury had the power but not the right to nullify. 
Sumner made a similar point five years later in relation to his Civil 
Rights Bill, which included a provision requiring the racial integration of 
juries even in state courts. One argument against this provision was that it 
was a step on the slippery slope to blacks serving as judges, which some 
senators, including Matthew Carpenter, a Moderate from Wisconsin, were 
not prepared to support. Sumner replied that jurors were more like witnesses 
determining facts than judges determining law. Since the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 established that blacks had the right to testify as witnesses, Sumner ar-
gued that they should have the right to serve as jurors too, even if they did 
not receive the right to serve as judges. Sumner charged that Carpenter 
knows well the history of trial by jury; he knows that at the beginning the jurors 
were witnesses from the neighborhood, afterward becoming judges, not of the 
law, but of the fact. . . . [N]ow I insist that they should come under the same rule 
as witnesses. . . . I say nothing about judges, for the distinction is obvious be-
tween the two cases.283 
  Nor was Sumner alone in his conviction that jurors were fact-finders but 
not law-deciders. Senator Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, another leading 
Radical, made the same argument in relation to a subsequent iteration of 
Sumner’s bill. “The jury,” Frelinghuysen defined, “is an institution for the 
trial of issues of fact by the people . . . .” He too emphasized that, like wit-
nesses, it is “acquainted with the mode of life, habits, and customs of the lo-
cality,”284 rather than acquainted with the law like officers or judges. After a 
series of narrow defeats, Sumner’s provision requiring racially integrated 
juries finally became law in March 1875, a year after Sumner’s death, 
through the Civil Rights Act of 1875.285 Its passage does not, of course, 
prove that the Senate accepted Frelinghuysen’s definition of the jury. None-
theless, Sumner’s and Frelinghuysen’s statements illustrate that at least 
these Congressional leaders believed that the jury’s role was to judge only 
the facts, not the law, and Congress’s passage of the provision may provide 
circumstantial evidence that others in Congress held this view too. 
  Senators not only discussed how jurors were supposed to decide cases 
but occasionally acted like jurors themselves. When Democrat Philip Fran-
cis Thomas presented credentials as Maryland’s senator-elect, several Re-
publicans objected, citing Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
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Test-Oath Act of 1862, which prohibited from serving in Congress those 
who had engaged in insurrection or had given aid or comfort to the enemy. 
In 1863, when Thomas’s eighteen-year-old son had told him that he was 
enlisting in the Confederate army, Thomas furnished him with $100 for his 
trip to the South.286 Thomas wanted to take the Senate’s test-oath because 
he did not believe that a personal gift to his son constituted giving aid to the 
enemy, and the Judiciary Committee reported favorably upon his creden-
tials. Nevertheless, the full Senate proceeded to debate his eligibility. 
  Senator Trumbull, an attorney admitted to the bar in two states, ex-
plained why he and his committee approved Thomas’s credentials.287 His 
colleague from Illinois, however, found him unpersuasive. “The question is 
did Mr. Thomas render assistance, did he give aid and comfort to the rebel-
lion?” Senator Richard Yates said. 
This is a question of fact. I will always yield to my colleague upon a question of 
law. His opinions upon law are convincing with me; they are conclusive with 
me; but in this case I act as a juror; the Senate is a jury; and it is a question of 
fact which we are called upon to decide.288 
Yates, therefore, believed that the juror’s role was to answer only questions 
of fact. While he would yield to the lawyer from Illinois on a question of 
law, he would not yield on a question of fact, just as jurors yield to the law-
trained judge on questions of law but not fact. 
  Senator William Morris Stewart, a leading Radical and principal author 
of the Fifteenth Amendment, backed Yates’s position. “Apply these facts,” 
he said: 
to any offense, to any common crime, even that of petty larceny, and there can 
be no doubt that a person who, knowing that a crime was to be committed, 
knowing the purpose of the party to be to commit a crime, aided him by giving 
him $100, would be held guilty; that fact alone would be deemed conclusive in 
any case as a matter of law, and the court would so instruct. The jury might ac-
quit, but that does not affect the question. The court would so instruct the jury as 
a matter of law.289 
Stewart was a Yale-trained attorney who had served as a district attorney 
and as California’s fifth Attorney General before representing Nevada in the 
Senate, so presumably he had thought about what substantive rights the 
right to jury trial protected. Like Yates, he thought that courts could instruct 
juries as a matter of law. While juries retained the power to defy judges’ in-
structions, Stewart does not indicate that such defiance was a protected 
right. In the end, Yates and Stewart were persuasive, and the full Senate nar-
rowly rejected Thomas.290 
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  This was the understanding not only of senators from states where courts 
had disallowed nullification, like Sumner of Massachusetts, but also of 
senators from states where nullification was still a right, including Trumbull 
and Yates of Illinois as well as Indiana’s Thomas Hendricks. Adopted in 
1851 and still on the books during Reconstruction—and even today—
Article I, Section 19 of Indiana’s Constitution declares, “In all criminal 
cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the 
facts.”291 During the Reconstruction Era, moreover, Indiana’s courts had not 
yet disallowed this right.292 Senator Hendricks, nevertheless, like nine-
teenth-century courts interpreting similar language not to protect the jury’s 
law-deciding right, appeared not to recognize a right to nullify in his state.  
  Passed over President Johnson’s veto, the Military Reconstruction Act of 
1867 allowed trials of civilians by military courts in the South even though 
the civil courts were open. William McCardle, a Mississippi newspaper 
publisher arrested for publishing incendiary articles by a military com-
mander, invoked habeas corpus and appealed to the Supreme Court, chal-
lenging the act’s constitutionality.293 Attorney General Henry Stanbery, a 
staunch Johnson supporter who thought that the Military Reconstruction Act 
was unconstitutional, refused to defend the statute before the Court.294 Al-
though Congress, with Senators Trumbull and Carpenter arguing the case, 
prevailed on a jurisdictional issue,295 Senator Howard, desiring Executive 
Branch support of Reconstruction legislation before the courts, proposed au-
thorizing the Secretary of War to appoint lawyers to defend the constitution-
ality of military action in Reconstruction cases.296 Defending his resolution, 
Howard said that the only appropriate course of action for an Attorney Gen-
eral was to defend the government’s position or to resign.297 
  Hendricks, a Democrat admitted to the bar in two states, objected to 
Howard’s attack on Stanbery, asserting that Stanbery ethically could not de-
fend a statute that he considered unconstitutional. According to Hendricks’s 
understanding of the law, an attorney, “whether he represents the Govern-
ment or a private citizen,” may not “represent the law to the court or the 
facts to the jury otherwise than in his judgment he believes them to be.” 
Hendricks acknowledged that he wished that he had Indiana’s state statutes 
with him, which defined the province of an attorney, but he said that above 
all, “that code declares that the attorney shall be true to the court in an ar-
gument of a question of law and true to the jury in an argument of a ques-
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tion of fact.”298 Neither Hendricks nor his interpretation of Indiana state law 
even considered that an attorney might argue law to a jury. His statements 
reveal that during Reconstruction even a senator from a pro-nullification 
state considered law-deciding outside the scope of the jury’s right. 
  Yet, senators did recognize that, though the jury’s right to nullify had 
been largely disallowed, some states still preserved it. During the Thirty-
ninth Congress, Senator Peter Van Winkle, a law-trained Moderate from 
West Virginia, delivered the clearest statement of a senator’s understanding 
of the jury’s law-deciding right. To him, that right was peculiar—and an 
abomination. Speaking on a Reconstruction bill to provide for increased 
federal oversight of Virginia, a state that did not disallow nullification until 
1881,299 he said: 
I know that the law is not administrated in that State as it ought to be. I know 
this particularly in reference to the freedman. I know that they are taken, tried 
for petty and trivial offenses, and the utmost penalty of the law is inflicted upon 
them. I am happy to say in regard to my former fellow-citizens that I am told 
this is not the fault of the judges nor the fault of the lawyers at the bar, who fre-
quently try to mitigate these penalties; but it is the fault of the juries, unin-
structed men probably. The administration of the criminal law in Virginia is pe-
culiar. In the first place, the juries are judges of both law and fact; and in the 
second place, in every case the jury fix the term of imprisonment, so that the 
judge has no control whatever over it.300 
Van Winkle announced that Virginia’s criminal law was “peculiar” because 
“juries are judges of both fact and law,” demonstrating that he believed that 
allowing the jury’s right to nullify was the exception rather than the rule. 
Furthermore, he considered the jury’s authority over law-deciding, which 
included the right to convict against the evidence, or at least to convict on 
trumped-up charges, just as it included the right to acquit against the evi-
dence, to be a significant cause of black oppression in the South. 
  The Reconstruction Congresses understood the jury’s right to nullify not 
to be included within the meaning of criminal jury, and thus they understood 
the Fourteenth Amendment not to protect or to incorporate the jury’s origi-
nal right to nullify. Yet, they understood far more than that. They also un-
derstood that nullification was intertwined with oppression, particularly in 
the South, and that Congress may or even must enact legislation, pursuant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, to prohibit it. 
E. The Paradox of New Original Meaning 
Despite the picture of original understanding that the Reconstruction-era 
treatises and Congressional debates appear to give us, there is a descriptive 
and a normative problem with relying on original meaning alone to deter-
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mine the new original meaning of Fourteenth Amendment jury law. De-
scriptively, there is the dilemma, inherent in all originalist analysis, about 
how to weigh contrarian voices. Although they were a minority, there were 
some in the Reconstruction Congresses who voiced support for the jury’s 
law-deciding right. This descriptive problem, however, is not a substantial 
concern because there were so few contrarian voices in the Reconstruction 
Congresses who understood the right to criminal jury by definition to in-
clude the jury’s right to nullify. In contrast to the words of leading Republi-
can senators like Trumbull, Sumner, Frelinghuysen, and Stewart, as well as 
senators across the aisle like Merrimon and Hendricks, I found only one ex-
ample of a member of Congress who clearly indicated that, like the Foun-
ders, he understood nullification to be a constitutional right. 
In early 1868, Congress continued asserting authority vis-à-vis the other 
branches of government. Congress not only had supplanted Presidential Re-
construction with Congressional Reconstruction and, through the House of 
Representatives’ vote in February, impeached President Johnson, but also it 
had waged war against the Supreme Court. The Judicial Circuits Act of 
1866 had reduced the Court’s size from ten to eight, and, in March, while 
William McCardle’s case was pending, Congress stripped the Court of ju-
risdiction to hear certain types of Reconstruction cases, preventing the Court 
from ruling on the Military Reconstruction Act’s validity. Representative 
Thomas Williams, a law-trained Radical Republican from Pennsylvania, 
wanted to curtail further the Court’s power to overturn Congressional legis-
lation, so he introduced a bill providing that only the unanimous agreement 
of the Supreme Court could strike down a law of Congress.301 
His rationale was that his legislation would make the Court analogous to 
the jury, a unanimity-based institution that Williams saw in the Founders’ 
luminous light. The jury, he insisted, was a “time-honored institution . . . 
imbedded in our constitution as the palladium of all our rights—the one 
great preeminent defense of private and public liberty.” It required unanim-
ity, he declared, because the “life and liberty and property of the citizen 
were not to be trusted to the keeping of the majority, or taken away except 
by the unanimous accord of all his judges, passing in criminal cases upon 
the law as upon the facts.” While the jury requires unanimity, the Court 
“claims to pass, by a divided vote, upon the fundamental law of a great na-
tion, and in effect to nullify that law . . . . Who, then, shall say that there is 
in this amendment anything unreasonable or unprecedented?”302 
Although his bill died quickly, Williams’s argument illustrates that he, 
like the Founders, believed that the criminal jury’s right to pass upon ques-
tions of law was inherent in the meaning of jury. Williams also recognized 
that, like the Supreme Court declaring an Act of Congress void, juries too 
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could “nullify” a law by refusing to convict. As long as the jury spoke 
unanimously, Williams appears to have approved of what he understood to 
be a time-honored right still legitimate in 1868. 
Other than Williams, though, no senator or representative appeared to 
understand nullification as either desirable or a right. The closest any came 
to doing so was to criticize, in the Justice Scalia mode, any intrusions on the 
jury right.303 These statements, which did not mention jury law-deciding, 
are too vague to draw conclusions about original meaning. Senator Justin 
Smith Morrill of Vermont, for example, eulogized a judge under whose au-
thority juries “suffered no depreciation, but their functions and capacity ap-
peared to be vindicated upon every trial.”304 Yet, he is an unlikely candidate 
for understanding the right to nullify as legitimate because he was a leading 
proponent of the Republicans’ anti-polygamy legislation that sought to re-
move constitutional questions from the jury’s reach and to purge prospec-
tive nullifiers. 
Furthermore, when opposing a treason trial jury bill, Senator Garrett 
Davis, a law-trained Democrat from Kentucky, said, “When you once com-
mence upon innovations upon the right of trial by jury no man can set limits 
to the extent to which those innovations may go. The only way to preserve 
the right of trial by jury sacred and inviolate is to permit no innovations 
upon it.”305 Was disallowing nullification an impermissible innovation? 
Davis did not think so. Only a year earlier he had insisted that Southern ju-
ries were not finding verdicts “in conflict with and in opposition to the law.” 
If juries did so, they would be “censurable”; however, he maintained that 
they were not because “juries find verdicts in conformity to the law.”306 
Davis therefore is not a candidate for a pro-nullification reading of the 
jury’s meaning in 1868 either. 
Although the descriptive problem may be overcome because the over-
whelming preponderance of the evidence shows that the Reconstruction 
Congresses understood the right to criminal jury not to include the right to 
nullify, there still remains the normative dilemma that I call the paradox of 
new original meaning. The paradox suggests that conscious structural de-
sign or original intent, as opposed to only original meaning, matters in cases 
of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation. Unless the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s original intent agreed with its original textual meaning, then the na-
tion, through the superdemocratic adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
may have, at least with respect to due process, paradoxically done little 
more than constitutionalize what was then undemocratic judicial precedent 
that transgressed the superdemocratically adopted old original meaning. 
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On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence of incorpo-
rating wholesale the original Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause makes little descriptive sense from an originalist per-
spective because, as the original understanding of nullification shows, the 
Fourteenth Amendment framers had a different conception of what “jury” 
and thus due process meant. There is no originalist evidence that they 
wanted to incorporate the 1791 definition of jury, as opposed to the 1868 
version, into the Due Process Clause,307 just as the Founders incorporated 
the contemporaneous late-eighteenth-century meanings of earlier English 
doctrines like the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, rather than 
the seventeenth-century understandings. 
On the other hand, though, it may be a shame if Congress unintention-
ally constitutionalized through the Due Process Clause undemocratic nine-
teenth-century judicial precedent that it did not support. In other words, if, 
as Professor Berger, Judge Weinstein, and others have reasoned, what the 
nineteenth-century judges had done in disallowing nullification was uncon-
stitutional before 1868 because it was did not accord with Founding-era 
originalism, then should these judges’ initially unconstitutional decisions be 
rendered instantaneously constitutional in 1868 only because the plain lan-
guage of due process—including its new, judicially constructed meaning of 
jury—was adopted in a new amendment? Is this back-door constitutional-
ism, where the changing meaning of “jury” slides in through the Due Proc-
ess Clause, a type of jurisprudence we desire? That is the paradox: it is con-
ceivable that the Thirty-ninth Congress constitutionalize a whole host of 
undemocratic criminal procedure practices merely because the original un-
derstanding of due process included them in 1868, even if Congress did not 
intend to make a distinction between the 1791 and 1868 meanings. 
There is something to be said for this concern. While we know that the 
Founders thought deeply about the jury’s right to interpret the law and to 
find against the evidence, the Reconstruction Congresses at times appear to 
have greatly minimized the issue. A series of proposed bills relating to trea-
son trials provides some circumstantial evidence that the Congresses ex-
pected juries to reach verdicts based only on the evidence, but it provides 
even more evidence that the Congresses simply were not thinking carefully 
about the issue. These bills appeared to use jury language carelessly. 
  In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the Thirty-ninth Con-
gresses’ Republicans expected the Johnson Administration to punish trai-
tors, particularly the Confederacy’s high officers, but in addition to the Ad-
ministration’s leniency, they faced a problem. Even in the case of Jefferson 
Davis, then housed in as a military prison at Fort Monroe, treason was a 
civil offense, not a military one, and therefore it required a civilian trial, 
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with an impartial jury.308 But how could a court find impartial jurors? How 
many reasonably intelligent and informed citizens would not have read or 
heard about the Civil War and formed at least some opinion about whether 
the Civil War was treason or, as Davis planned to argue, self-defense?309 
  In December 1865, Senator James Rood Doolittle, a Moderate Republi-
can from Wisconsin, proposed a solution. He introduced a bill providing 
that in trials for offenses against the United States, a juror would not be dis-
qualified even if he had 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals, or the common his-
tory of the times, provided he be otherwise competent, and upon his oath de-
clare, and it appear to the satisfaction of the court that, notwithstanding such 
opinion, he can and will impartially try the accused upon the crime charged in 
the indictment, and a true verdict give upon the evidence to be produced upon 
the trial.310 
Upon first glance, it appears that Doolittle thought that jurors must give 
their verdicts “upon the evidence” only, not also upon the law, which sug-
gests that he did not understand jury to include the right to nullify. This is 
particularly important in the context of treason because in the late-
eighteenth-century treason trials arising from the Whiskey Rebellion, law-
yers for both sides had been allowed to debate before the jury the question 
of whether armed resistance to enforcement of the Excise Act constituted 
treason, and the jury had been permitted to decide among the various state-
ments by the lawyers and the judges in reaching their verdict.311 Through 
the evidence-only provision, therefore, Doolittle would have been rejecting 
the Founding-era practice in treason trials in favor of a different Reconstruc-
tion-era one. At least, that is what his bill’s plain language suggests. 
  The following month, however, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
amended his bill and removed the reference to “upon the evidence,” for an 
unreported reason. Doolittle not only did not object but even said that the 
committee put his bill “in a better form than it was originally as drawn by 
myself,”312 suggesting that the law-evidence distinction was utterly unim-
portant to both Doolittle and the Judiciary Committee. Yet maybe it was im-
portant. Doolittle’s amended bill died in the Thirty-ninth Congress, but in 
the Fortieth Congress, Senator Trumbull pushed a later iteration of it that 
once again referred to “a true verdict upon the evidence to be produced at 
trial.”313 This evidence-only bill easily passed the Senate,314 and, though 
Senator Davis, among others, criticized the earlier iteration for intruding 
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upon the right of criminal jury trial,315 neither he nor the other senators dis-
cussed the evidence-only provision. Thus, the evidence-only provision may 
have consciously rejected the Founding-era understanding of the jury’s right 
to decide law in treason trials, or the law-evidence distinction may not have 
been considered at all. 
  The House debates are also unclear. The original, virtually identical 
House bill regarding “trials for treason against the United States” required 
jurors to swear to give a true verdict “upon the evidence to be produced 
upon trial.”316 In December 1866, however, William Lawrence of Ohio, a 
leading Radical Republican on the Judiciary Committee, substituted the 
evidence-only bill with a new one that he said was modeled on Ohio’s jury 
statute, which, among other changes, now required jurors “to render an im-
partial verdict upon the law and evidence.”317 Was Lawrence aware that his 
state’s statute had a pro-nullification understanding of the jury? Did he want 
this to be his colleagues’ understanding too? The House never debated the 
difference between the evidence-only and the law-and-evidence bills, Law-
rence’s bill did not pass the House in the Thirty-ninth Congress, and it failed 
again in the Fortieth Congress after he reintroduced the “law and evidence” 
version. None of the treason trial bills became law. 
Hence, both senators and representatives included language in proposed 
bills instructing jurors to decide criminal cases “upon the evidence” only or 
“upon the law and evidence” without distinguishing between the two ver-
sions, at least in the floor debates. Did they not see the difference between 
one version that accorded with the Reconstruction-era treatises and the other 
that agreed with the Founding-era right? Did they not realize that their un-
derstanding of due process and its jury rights would affect constitutional 
law? If they did not, then should the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional-
ize the then-existing meaning of due process, constructed by the undemo-
cratic judges rather than by the Reconstruction Congresses that framed and 
interpreted the amendment? Is only original meaning, as opposed to con-
scious decisionmaking, enough? 
 Fortunately, though, there are answers to this paradox. First, although a 
few proposed jury bills appeared to use jury language carelessly, the Recon-
struction Congresses, as their overwhelming preponderance of their words 
showed, understood the difference between right and power in the jury con-
text. They consciously chose to understand jury nullification as a power but 
not a right, and they consciously preferred that reading. They understood the 
argument that nullification was a right, and, unlike many state legislatures, 
they rejected it. It was outside their conception of the meaning of jurors—
their conception of due process, not just the judges’ conception. 
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Second, we are not compelled to rely only on original meaning. There is 
strong evidence that the Reconstruction Congresses structured the Four-
teenth Amendment in such a way that would permit or even require them to 
curtail jury nullification in places where it predominated. They did not 
merely understand nullification to be outside the meaning of jury; they, like 
the nineteenth-century judges, intended, at least in some cases, to eliminate 
it. They were not merely constitutionalizing an undemocratic judiciary’s 
precedents; they were consciously and superdemocratically transforming or 
superseding the late-eighteenth-century Constitution and its jury provisions. 
Their new original understanding of jury, which excluded nullification 
as a component, meant that the original understanding was that nullification 
would not be protected through Fourteenth Amendment due process or in-
corporation of the Sixth Amendment. On the contrary, their understanding 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was that it permitted or required the disal-
lowance of nullification in state and federal courts. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DISALLOWANCE OF THE RIGHT TO NULLIFY 
Discovering the Reconstruction-era original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of criminal jury trial gets us halfway to offering an 
originalist, textual basis for disallowing the jury’s right to nullify. This 
original meaning shows us that nullification in 1868 was not conceived of 
as a constituent right of criminal trial by jury like it had been in 1791, and 
thus the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers and ratifiers would not have un-
derstood Fourteenth Amendment due process, natural rights, or incorpora-
tion to protect the right to nullify in the sense that the Sixth Amendment’s 
framers understood their amendment to protect it. Yet the new original 
meaning gets us only halfway. The paradox begs us to answer whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s framers and ratifiers consciously preferred the Re-
construction-era meaning, as opposed to the Founding-era one, and hence 
consciously constitutionalized the nineteenth-century judicial precedent. In 
addition, there is the issue of American federalism. 
Although neither pro-nullification originalists nor those who prefer the 
Supreme Court’s current doctrinally based anti-nullification doctrine draw a 
distinction between state and federal cases, Reconstruction-era original 
meaning jurisprudence suggests that there is an argument that we must do 
so to remain faithful to the text and original meaning. On its surface, after 
all, the Fourteenth Amendment appears directed only at the states and thus 
should not necessarily affect rights in federal criminal cases. Even if the 
disallowance of nullify were incorporated against the states, originalists like 
Professor Berger still could argue to the originalist Supreme Court that nul-
lification was of constitutional dimension when the Sixth Amendment was 
ratified and must be restored in federal courts. One solution to this dilemma, 
of course, is reverse incorporation and the desire to have uniform constitu-
tional rights in state and federal court. While the current Court demands 
such unity from the Founding-era perspective, applying 1791 meaning to  
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state cases, may be at least as logical to apply the 1868 meaning to federal 
cases because criminal procedure doctrine is overwhelmingly state-based. 
A more satisfying rationale, however, is that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Reconstruction-era original meaning either transformed or super-
seded the Sixth Amendment’s Founding-era original meaning. The Four-
teenth Amendment, in other words, through its explicit due process and 
implicit jury rights provisions, may have constitutionalized the judicial dis-
allowance of nullification. This rationale is based in the way that the Four-
teenth Amendment revolutionized the nature of federalism and civil rights. 
Against the backdrop of the Sixth Amendment’s original guarantee of de-
fendants’ and juries’ rights, which was based in local resistance to tyrannical 
federal law, the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a civil right of protec-
tion of individual life, liberty, property, and security that was enforceable by 
the federal government against tyrannical individuals, localities, and states 
that deprived that right. Although the right to nullify may have been implicit 
at the Founding, in redefining due process and the American judicial sys-
tem, the Fourteenth Amendment’s new vision of courts and juries, new 
commitment to civil rights, and new prioritization of governmental author-
ize may have redefined the original Constitution’s implicit meanings. New 
rights created by the Fourteenth Amendment may have trumped certain 
older, merely penumbral rights. In this way, victims’ civil right to protection 
in life, liberty, property, and security and the government’s right to enforce 
that right through convictions without law-based resistance from local juries 
may have curtailed the jury’s right to nullify even in some federal cases. 
This abstract theory is backed by the Reconstruction Congresses them-
selves, which expressed hostility to jury nullification and understood that 
nullification threatened to defeat both the ideology of the Republican Party, 
upon which much of Reconstruction was built, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, along with its enforcement legislation. The only way that the Section 
1 civil rights guarantee could be “self-executing” and that Section 5 legisla-
tion could “enforce” the Section 1 guarantee was for courts to disallow nul-
lification. Congress’s enforcement and related legislation specifically pro-
hibited nullification in federal courts, illustrating that the Reconstruction 
Congresses understood the Constitution and the amendment’s grant of 
power either to authorize or to require the disallowance of nullification, at 
least in pursuit of civil rights. Their legislation, as post-enactment evidence 
of their vision of the Fourteenth Amendment and its effect on juries, ulti-
mately may point to the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment’s new 
original meaning transformed or superseded the old original meaning of the 
“jury,” and thus of nullification, in Article III and the Sixth Amendment. 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Protection 
Proposed by the future Grant Administration Attorney General Con-
gressman Ebenezer Hoar and insisted upon by other Reconstruction leaders 
like Charles Sumner and Salmon Chase, a principal plank of the antebellum 
Republican Party Platform called for the federal government to abolish  
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within its jurisdiction the “twin relics of barbarism”—black slavery and po-
lygamy, which they considered akin to female slavery.318 By 1866, when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, the Republican Party had done so, 
at least in name: the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery every-
where,319 and the Morrill Anti-Polygamy Act outlawed polygamy in all fed-
eral territory,320 the only jurisdiction where polygamy was widely practiced. 
Yet abolishing the “twin relics of barbarism” in name only was just the be-
ginning of the Republican agenda. The Reconstruction-era Republicans in-
tended more than mere declarations of rights—hence the unprecedented 
Section 2 enforcement provision of the Thirteenth Amendment, along with 
its sister sections in the other Reconstruction Amendments.321 The Republi-
cans intended not just to proclaim the right to liberty but also to guarantee it 
with a corresponding right implicit in liberty, the right to protection. 
The civil right to protection was essential to the Republicans’ Recon-
struction program from the start. The Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, a 
landmark companion statute to the Fourteenth Amendment, provided that 
“the right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings con-
cerning personal liberty, personal security . . . shall be secured to and en-
joyed by all the citizens” of the South.322 The Republicans then constitu-
tionalized the right to the full benefit of laws concerning personal security 
or protection through the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Steven Heyman 
has marshaled substantial evidence that Section 1 was both intended and 
understood to establish a constitutional civil right to protection, which in-
cluded a federal guarantee that deterrent criminal laws would be enacted 
and enforced—through convictions.323 The right to protection meant protec-
tion not only protection against the state but also protection by the state 
against private wrongs. Since the widespread violence against blacks in the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s wake convinced Republicans that the states could 
not be relied upon for protection, the Fourteenth Amendment empowered 
the federal government to enforce the right to protection.324 
Throughout the Thirty-ninth Congress, Republicans repeated their un-
derstanding that among the civil rights that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would guarantee was the right to protection. Representative Samuel Shella-
barger called it “self-evident” that “protection by the Government is the 
right of every citizen.”325 Senator Stewart added, “It is the duty of the Gov-
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ernment to protect; of the subject to obey.”326 “These are the essential ele-
ments of citizenship,” echoed Senator Morrill, “allegiance on one side and 
protection on the other.”327 “Allegiance and protection are reciprocal 
rights,” Senator Trumbull elaborated: 
[C]an it be that . . . the people of our day have struggled through a war, with all 
its sacrifices and all its desolation, to maintain it, and at last . . . we have got a 
Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of the citizen, but 
has no power to afford him protection? . . . American citizenship would be little 
worth if it did not carry protection with it.328 
  Recounting and denouncing violence against freedmen and Unionists in 
the South and the inability or unwillingness of local authorities to suppress 
it, Republicans emphasized that the right to protection included criminal 
protection through the enforcement of criminal laws.329 Even their oppo-
nents agreed. Freedom “does mean protection,” Senator James McDougall, 
a Democrat from California, concurred. “Under all Governments that are 
free, freedom is perfect protection in life, liberty, and the enjoyment and 
pursuit of happiness.”330 Senator Edgar Cowan, a conservative Republican 
from Pennsylvania who opposed the Fourteenth Amendment and was not 
returned to the Senate, opposed black citizenship, but he agreed that even an 
alien was entitled “to the protection of the laws. You cannot murder him 
with impunity. . . . He has a right to the protection of the laws.”331 Absent 
conviction of white murderers, however, blacks would be slaughtered with 
impunity. The difference between the Fourteenth Amendment’s proponents 
and opponents was not whether protection was a right; it was whether it 
should be a federal right too. The proponents, of course, prevailed. 
In addition to the Republicans’ general understanding, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s specific text guaranteed the right to protection through two 
clauses. The Privileges and Immunities Clause made protection a substan-
tive right of citizenship. Section 1 commanded that “[n]o State shall . . . 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,”332 but 
it left the term “privileges or immunities” undefined. In explaining the 
clause to their colleagues, Senators Trumbull and Howard cited Corfield v. 
Coryell,333 which was the first and still then “the leading case” defining 
“privileges and immunities.”334 In Corfield, Justice Washington declared: 
[T]hese fundamental principles . . . may . . . be all comprehended under the fol-
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lowing general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pur-
sue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as 
the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.335 
According to Justice Washington, then, the right to “[p]rotection by the gov-
ernment” was distinct from and equal to the great inalienable rights to life, 
liberty, and property. Since the Thirty-ninth Congress and Reconstruction-
era generation relied upon Corfield to define “privileges and immunities,” 
this was their understanding of the right. Therefore, they understood the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause to guarantee the right of protection and 
Section 5 to authorize Congress to enforce that guarantee. 
  The Due Process Clause also guaranteed that right. In 1868, some of the 
civil rights listed within the clause were understood to have positive con-
tent.336 In defining due process, Representative Bingham, the author of Sec-
tion 1, said that it guaranteed the right “of all persons to be protected in life, 
liberty, and property.”337 Like their contemporary Thomas Cooley, the Four-
teenth Amendment’s framers also drew upon Blackstone to define due proc-
ess. Blackstone treated the Magna Charta’s analogous provision as having a 
positive dimension, explaining that it “protected every individual of the na-
tion in the free enjoyment of his life, his liberty and his property, unless de-
clared to be forfeited by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”338 
Due process, in other words, required the state to protect individuals and to 
secure their life, liberty, and property, unless they forfeited that protection. 
  Furthermore, Professor Heyman argues that the term “deprive” then 
meant not only to take away a possession but also to divest of a right.339 In 
that sense, the state could not take life, liberty, or property directly without 
due process, but it also could not refuse to protect an individual in life, lib-
erty, or property, thereby depriving him of security against the invasion of 
those rights by others. In that vein, Representative Lawrence explained that 
“there are two ways in which a State may undertake to deprive citizens of 
[their] absolute, inherent, and inalienable rights: either by prohibitory laws, 
or by a failure to protect any one of them.” Wherever the law guarantees a 
right, such as those of life, liberty, and property, it also necessarily gives a 
corresponding “means whereby [the right] may be possessed and en-
joyed.”340 Likewise, Representative James Wilson of Iowa, who chaired the 
House Judiciary Committee, explained that the Due Process Clause encom-
passed not only the rights of life, liberty, and property but also “those which 
are necessary for the protection and maintenance and perfect enjoyment of 
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the rights thus specifically named.”341 The right to protection, therefore, 
was ingrained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning. 
  This right leads us to juries. Professor King assumed that the “interest of 
the government or of the victim in a conviction free from nullification is dif-
ficult to characterize as part of the due process guaranteed by [the Four-
teenth A]mendment.”342 Consequently, she added that even if “sometime 
during the nineteenth century judges, not jurors, became the better protec-
tors of individual rights (at the time that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified, for example),” this would not change her constitutional analysis be-
cause “such concerns about competency are irrelevant” to the Constitution’s 
original meaning and structure.343 The right to protection at the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s core, however, illustrates that the interest of the government 
and the victim in civil rights necessitated their interest in the enforcement of 
those rights through criminal laws and thus criminal convictions. Under 
originalist jurisprudence, competency concerns should be relevant if a new 
amendment, by definition altering the old constitutional text, includes them 
within its original meaning. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in 
large part to guarantee and to enforce the protection of civil rights. If an old, 
penumbral right—such as the Sixth Amendment right to jury nullification—
would, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning, interfere with 
the new, prioritized right, the new right may take precedence. 
  The principal example, of course, involves federalism. The great objec-
tion to the Fourteenth Amendment and its enforcement legislation was that 
they infringed upon the rights of the states guaranteed in the original mean-
ing of the Founding-era Constitution and Bill of Rights. The federal gov-
ernment, opponents cried, was invading the states’ exclusive provinces, 
such as their responsibility for protecting citizens against criminal of-
fenses.344 Defending one bill to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Sena-
tor Oliver Hazard Perry Morton of Indiana responded: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
But it is said these crimes should be punished by the States; that . . . the matter 
should be left with the States. The answer to that is, that the States do not punish 
them; the States do not protect the rights of the people; the State courts are pow-
erless to redress these wrongs. . . . Shall it be said with any reason that it is 
proper to leave the punishment of these crimes to the States when it is a notori-
ous fact that the States do not punish them?345 
If states’ rights guaranteed in the old Constitution interfered with rights 
guaranteed in the new amended Constitution, then those rights must recede 
into history, and the federal government must intervene in state affairs. 
  Similarly, if old Article III and Sixth Amendment jury rights were inter-
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fering with and contextually incompatible with Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, then the Fourteenth Amendment must transform or supersede those 
rights too. Like the states cited by Senator Morton, juries were tied to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s right to protection. In speaking on Senator Sum-
ner’s bill to integrate juries, the law-trained Senator Edmunds, who would 
take a lead in subsequent polygamy-related jury legislation explained: 
[S]o far as the right to sit upon a jury goes . . . that right must not only be de-
fended by a penalty imposed on people who deny it, but it must be defended af-
firmatively for the protection of the community who are to be benefited by it. 
. . . [Therefore,] the fourteenth amendment allows Congress to require that col-
ored men shall sit upon juries.346 
  Senator Edmunds illustrates that the Reconstruction-era Congress under-
stood that juries affected “the protection of the community” whose crimes 
they evaluated. The Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to pass 
legislation affecting juries to defend affirmatively the right to protection. 
One solution was, as Senators Sumner and Edmunds advocated, integrating 
juries by adding blacks to juries that had been all white as well as adding 
non-Mormons to juries that had been all Mormon. Another solution was to 
purge those interfering with the right to protection—the nullifiers. 
B. Race, the Southern States, and the Disallowance of Jury Nullification 
The typical story told about white jury nullification in the Reconstruc-
tion South is that Congress responded by integrating juries through the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, which forbade disqualification from jury service on the 
basis of race and made it a crime for any state or federal official to discrimi-
nate on racial grounds in selecting jurors.347 Professor Forman, for exam-
ple, focuses on the ways that Reconstruction Republicans worked “to elimi-
nate barriers to black participation in the legal system, with a view toward 
ultimately securing the right of blacks to serve as jurors.”348 Likewise, Pro-
fessor Randall Kennedy writes that the Republican Party responded to white 
nullification with “the elevation of blacks to formal equality with 
whites.”349 Professor Amar similarly emphasizes how “Reconstruction Re-
publicans facing southern jury nullification . . . reconstruct[ed] juries by re-
populating them with blacks alongside whites.”350 Yet, there was another 
response to Southern nullification, one that was not about making juries 
more democratic, more demographically representative, or more powerful. 
Instead, it was about crippling local resistance to federal authority, disquali-
fying large proportions of local populations that previously had been eligi-
ble for jury service, and empowering federal judges at the expense of local 
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prospective jurors. This response was about obtaining convictions even with 
juries that Professor Kermit Hall suggested were “less representative of the 
defendants” than any other political trial in American history.351 In brief, it 
was about ending jury nullification in the South. 
The Republican Party was founded on a platform of abolishing the “relic 
of barbarianism” that was slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment formally 
achieved that goal. Yet what immediately followed may not have been less 
barbaric. Postwar justice for freedmen in the South was atrocious; it was not 
compatible with a right to liberty, and some even compared it unfavorably 
with the justice that slaves used to receive.352 While one problem was un-
equal treatment for black defendants, the larger problem was the need to 
protect freedmen from becoming victims of crime,353 a concern that we saw 
was at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment. The infrequency with which 
whites were convicted of crimes against freedmen, not to mention crimes 
against Republicans or Unionists, not only was unjust but also encouraged 
more white violence.354 Sheriffs, justices of the peace, and other local civil 
officials were reluctant to prosecute whites, but Republicans agreed that the 
most important factor contributing to injustice was the juries.355 
Throughout the South, white juries were viewed as the principal cause 
of Reconstruction injustice. In Texas, for example, the state prosecuted over 
five hundred whites for murdering blacks in 1865 and 1866, but in every 
one of the trials, the all-white juries acquitted every one of the white defen-
dants.356 A Freedmen’s Bureau officer in Georgia conceded that the “best 
men in the State admit that no jury would convict a white man for killing a 
freedman.”357 Likewise, a sheriff in Florida lamented, “If a white man kills 
a colored men in any of the counties of this state, you cannot convict 
him,”358 while an observer in Richmond pointed out that “the verdicts are 
always for the white man and against the colored man.”359 Testifying before 
Congress, Judge Settle of North Carolina reported that the “defect lies not 
so much with the courts as with the juries. You cannot get a conviction; you 
cannot get a bill found by the grand jury; or, if you do, the petit jury acquits 
the parties.” He added that no matter how vigilant the civil authorities were, 
they could not punish white offenders because: 
[i]n nine cases out of ten the men who commit the crimes constitute or sit on the 
grand jury, either they themselves or their near relatives or friends, sympathiz-
ers, aiders, or abettors; and if a bill is found it is next to impossible to secure a 
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conviction upon a trial at the bar. I have heard of no instance in North Carolina 
where a conviction of that sort has taken place.360 
Congress was well aware of the Southern juries’ defects throughout Re-
construction. Senator Edmunds said that in the South “a jury trial is a mock-
ery; it is a shield for cruelty and crime instead of being an instrument of 
punishment for it.”361 Henry Pease, a carpetbag senator from Mississippi, 
reported that in the South a “white man may slay a negro, and it may be 
proven as clear as the noon-day sun that it was a case of murder with malice 
aforethought; and yet you cannot get a jury to convict.” He continued: 
[I]n the State of Mississippi, where our laws are executed with as much imparti-
ality as in any other southern State, I do not know among the several hundred 
homicides committed in that State a single instance, since reconstruction, where 
a white man has been convicted of killing a negro; and I venture the assertion 
that there have been over five hundred murders of negroes in that State by white 
men, and not one of them punished.362 
  Some even identified Southern juries’ acquittals as based on the juries’ 
prejudiced conception of the law, rather than on simple outright prejudice. 
Referring to Dred Scott,363 Senator Morton contended that most Southern 
whites “have been educated and taught to believe that colored men have no 
civil and political rights that white men are bound to respect.”364 They, in 
other words, may have understood the law to permit or to require acquittals 
in instances of white violence. Indeed, one judge reported that some whites 
“feel and believe, morally, socially, politically, or religiously, that it is not 
murder for a white man to take the life of a negro with malice afore-
thought.”365 Certainly Congress, if it was serious about enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment’s right to federal protection, could not allow jurors who 
understood the law to permit white violence to decide cases based on such 
an interpretation of law. 
  In early 1871, as white violence and jury nullification continued 
throughout the South, Congress held hearings on one major source of prob-
lems: the Ku Klux Klan. Congress heard dozens of witnesses testify and 
collected hundreds of pages of testimony about the organization, including 
its jury practices.366 “The evidence shows that this Ku Klux organization,” 
Senator Morton concluded, requires its members “to commit perjury as ju-
rors, and to acquit at all hazards one of their number who may be on 
trial.”367 Among a litany of wrongs he discovered, Representative Clinton 
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Cobb of North Carolina condemned KKK members because as jurors “they 
have nullified trials by perjury.”368 Such nullification, the legislators real-
ized, escalated violence. Where KKK members “sit upon juries,” Senator 
Thomas Osborn of Florida recognized, “outrages of the worst order, the 
most inhuman violence and cold-blooded murders are committed with im-
punity.”369 “What is the civil law to” a KKK member, asked Senator 
Charles Drake of Missouri, “when he knows that . . . the jurors who go there 
will acquit him in spite of all the evidence.”370 
  In February, the House Committee on Reconstruction produced a report 
calling for legislation in response to the violence in the South. The Four-
teenth Amendment, it noted, vested in Congress “the power, by proper legis-
lation, to prevent any State from depriving any citizen of the United States 
the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.” Given the inability of each 
Southern state to punish crime after it has been committed, the report con-
cluded that each state had “by its neglect or want of power, deprived the 
citizens of the United States of protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, 
and property as fully and completely as if it had passed a legislative act to 
the same effect.”371 Taking up the invitation, Representative Benjamin But-
ler, a Radical from Massachusetts, drafted an initial bill and Samuel Shella-
barger, a Radical from Ohio, submitted a subsequent one “to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”372 The bill, which was enacted in April as the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871,373 designated certain conspiracies to deprive citi-
zens of federal rights or equal protection as offenses punishable under fed-
eral law and provided a federal cause of action for those whose federal 
rights were violated under color of state law.374 
  Republicans expressed two Fourteenth Amendment justifications for the 
legislation, one based on the federal government’s affirmative power to pro-
tect life, liberty, and property directly when states fail to do so and the other 
based on an equal protection rationale. All but four members of Congress 
who had voted for the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 and were still serving 
in Congress voted for the KKK Act, which they saw as a continuation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.375 They also saw the act as a remedy for the KKK-
infiltrated juries throughout the South. “Now, if there be any combination of 
men who shall combine and conspire together,” Representative Burton 
Cook of Illinois said, “. . . to compel a jury in a United States court to give a 
false verdict . . . that combination is an offense against the United States, for 
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the simple reason easily understood, that it seeks to deprive a citizen of the 
United States of a right guarantied to him by the Constitution of the United 
States.”376 Furthermore, Shellabarger’s original bill was amended to include 
a new section directly targeting juries. Section 5 provided: 
[N]o person shall be a grand or petit juror in any court of the United States upon 
any inquiry, hearing, or trial of any suit, proceeding, or prosecution based upon 
or arising under the provisions of this act who shall, in the judgment of the 
court, be in complicity with any such combination or conspiracy; and every such 
juror shall, before entering upon any such inquiry, hearing, or trial, take and 
subscribe an oath in open court that he has never, directly or indirectly, coun-
selled, advised, or voluntarily aided any such combination or conspiracy . . . .377 
  Based on a Civil War statute that had required federal jurors to swear 
past and future loyalty to the United States and had disqualified many men 
who had fought for the Confederacy from federal jury service,378 Section 5 
barred from civil rights cases any juror who could not swear that he had 
never even indirectly aided, counseled, or advised a conspiracy to deny 
freedmen their civil rights. Moreover, prospective jurors who lied in an at-
tempt to qualify for jury service would be subject to federal perjury charges, 
and the ultimate decision about a juror’s qualification was left to judgment 
of federal judges. Congress had replaced the historic localism of juries with 
federal orders to be executed by federal judges. 
  The KKK Act aroused much opposition from Democrats because it 
made violence infringing civil and political rights a federal crime and thus 
acted upon individuals rather than the states.379 Its jury provision was not 
immune from criticism either. “Gentlemen on the other side have denounced 
the law which applies the oath to jurors as an infamous law,” Representative 
Butler reported. He argued that Congress should not allow men effectively 
engaging in a continuing rebellion against the federal government: 
to sit on juries and enforce our laws to put down a new rebellion when a judge 
of the United States thinks it is not safe for them to sit there . . . . Sir, in my 
judgment, it would be infamous, if that is the word always to be used to charac-
terize laws, for us to permit the men who started the old rebellion, and who are 
fostering this, who stand by it day by day and are murdering our friends, black 
and white, to sit upon the juries and deal with questions of fact in cases where in 
the last resort we must go to the courts for redress under our Constitution and 
laws.380 
Speaking on the Republicans’ behalf, Butler suggested that juries were au-
thorized to do no more than “deal with questions of fact” and that they had 
to do so honestly. Federal judges should be charged with suppressing wide-
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spread nullification that was denying freedmen their civil rights, preventing 
them from seeking legal redress, and thus fomenting more violence. 
  In response to this rationale, Eugene Casserly, who led the Democratic 
opposition in the Senate, charged the KKK Act with court-packing and vio-
lating the right to jury trial. Cases would be fixed, and juries would no 
longer be representative of the dominant political community. He argued: 
I do not believe that ten per cent of the white people of the South fit to serve 
upon a jury, grand or petit, could take that oath. It would have been a great deal 
more honest and manly to have just excluded all such men from juries and to 
have provided that nobody should sit upon a jury, either grand or petit, except a 
man who had always been loyal and a man who was black; and that is the effect 
of it. It confines your juries entirely to the so-called loyalists of the southern 
States and the black people there. You are to have no other jurors; in other 
words, you pack your juries.381 
Of course, it was precisely the KKK Act’s purpose to limit Southern juries 
to Unionists, freedmen, and others who would execute federal law and 
therefore guarantee the freedmen’s right of protection. The KKK Act was 
meant to secure convictions, which were the only way to enforce civil 
rights, to limit violence and to bring justice to the South. 
  Given the circumstances of the Reconstruction South, the KKK Act’s 
jury provision worked. In South Carolina, for example, federal troops ar-
rested more than four hundred Klansmen, and to oversee their trials Presi-
dent Grant appointed a fearless federal judge who was determined to have a 
jury that was both racially integrated and free from prospective nullifiers. 
Because Judge Bond insisted on implementing the KKK Act’s jury provi-
sion, many of the white jurors summoned to serve defaulted, and the 
twenty-one member grand jury ended up including fifteen blacks and a 
white Republican as its foreman. Of the petit jurors, more than two-thirds 
were black, and no defendant had a jury composed of a majority of whites. 
Unable to rely on their henchmen to acquit them, more than one hundred 
Klansmen pled guilty, and the government won either guilty verdicts or 
courtroom confessions in the five cases that went to trial.382 In North Caro-
lina hundreds more were indicted and many were sent to prison, while the 
U.S. attorney in Mississippi indicted over six hundred Klansmen.383 In 
1872, federal prosecutors achieved over five hundred jury convictions, more 
than a tenfold increase from just two years earlier.384 Although only several 
hundred men were imprisoned in a region where thousands had committed 
violent felonies, even these convictions reinvigorated the morale of South-
ern Republicans, enabled blacks to exercise their rights as citizens, pro-
duced a dramatic decline in violence throughout the South, and largely 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  381 C ONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 766 (1871) (statement of Sen. Casserly). 
  382  See Hall, supra note 154, at 934–41. 
  383  See FONER, supra note 222, at 457. 
  384  See Forman, supra note 182, at 925–26.  
April 2009  RECONSTRUCTION AND JURY NULLIFICATION 72 
ended the Reconstruction-era career of the KKK.385 
  This achievement was possible only because the federal government 
purged white Southern nullifiers from federal juries, in addition to integrat-
ing those juries with freedmen. The Reconstruction Congresses felt author-
ized by the Constitution, or even compelled by the civil right to protection, 
to transform federal jury law. In doing so, however, the Reconstruction 
Congresses did not insist that juries were supposed to be demographically 
representative of the local community—owing to the jury provision dis-
qualification, blacks were disproportionately represented in the KKK trial 
juries—and they did not shy away from empowering federal judges to de-
termine the composition of juries, a far different power dynamic between 
judge and jury than existed at the Founding. Moreover, unlike their Found-
ing forbearers, they did not see juries as representing the “conscience” of 
the community—a community that happened to be a sick Southern soci-
ety—or as entitled to decide questions of law in addition to fact. Juries ex-
isted only to decide questions of fact. They were not to thwart the civil au-
thorities’ execution of laws to protect civil rights with which they disagreed. 
Reconstruction shifted authority not only from the peripheral states to the 
national center but also from local juries to the government itself.  
Yet, for all that this episode teaches us about the Reconstruction-era 
right to nullify, there are two significant reasons why the intersection of ju-
ries and the South is not a perfect example of how the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s framers understood their amendment to transform jury law. First, 
white Southern juries may not have been engaging in “core” jury nullifica-
tion when they were acquitting whites against the evidence and in spite of 
the law because the juries may not have been resting their verdicts on their 
honest interpretation of the law. While the Chief Justice of the U.S. Su-
preme Court was able to write in 1857 that, based on the original meaning 
of the Constitution, blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound 
to respect,”386 perhaps not even the right to protection, such an assertion 
was no longer constitutionally plausible after the Civil War and the Four-
teenth Amendment guaranteed freedmen civil rights. Second, the Recon-
struction Congresses’ response to the white nullifiers was to exclude only 
those who had committed actions—not those who merely had different, le-
gitimate interpretation of the law. Even the most innocuous purged juror un-
der the KKK Act had, according to the judge, at least “indirectly” coun-
seled, advised, or aided an illegal conspiracy. The true test of the 
Reconstruction Congresses’ understanding of nullification would come 
when they considered prospective jurors who had done nothing illegal but 
simply had a different understanding of constitutional law. 
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C. Polygamy, the Utah Territory, and the Disallowance of Jury Nullification 
If Southern jury nullification did not go to the core of nullification doc-
trine, the nullification in Utah did. Jurors there consciously believed that a 
federal criminal statute was unconstitutional. In support of their belief, they 
made plausible constitutional arguments, ones that were also voiced by 
members of the Reconstruction Congresses and by a distinguished attorney 
before the Supreme Court shortly after Reconstruction had ended. The Re-
publican majority in the Reconstruction Congresses sought to purge these 
jurors based solely on their belief that the statute was unconstitutional, even 
if the jurors had never committed any illegal actions themselves. In other 
words, Republicans understood the Constitution to empower them to disal-
low even jury nullification in non-race-related cases by law-abiding citizens 
that was based on disputed understandings of the Constitution. 
Established as part of the Compromise of 1850, the Utah Territory found 
itself at the center of national controversy two years later when Brigham 
Young, Utah’s territorial governor and the Mormon Church’s president, pro-
claimed that Mormons believed in and practiced polygamy,387 which was 
not then prohibited at the federal level by Congress or in Utah by the territo-
rial legislature.388 At its first national nominating convention in 1856, the 
Republican Party equated polygamy, which they deemed female slavery, 
alongside black slavery as the “twin relics of barbarism” that the party was 
committed to abolishing, at least in federal jurisdictions.389 Over the next 
four years, Republicans advocated legislation to prohibit polygamy in the 
territories but were stymied by Southern Democrats who feared that anti-
polygamy legislation was a step on the path toward the federal abolition of 
slavery.390 In 1862, after the Southerners had seceded, the Morrill Act for 
the Suppression of Polygamy,391 which outlawed bigamy in the territories 
and provided for a prison sentence of up to five years, overwhelmingly 
passed the Republican-dominated Congress.392 
Despite the Morrill Act’s tremendous support in Washington, it did not 
effectively dismantle polygamy and end “female slavery” in Utah. As a fed-
eral criminal statute, it required jury trials, and no Mormon jury would in-
dict, let alone convict, the Mormon men who violated the statute. Even gov-
ernment officials flaunted the statute. In 1862, the federally appointed 
Governor Stephen Harding complained that “it is recommended by those in 
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high authority that no regard whatever should be paid” to the act,393 and as 
late as 1865, two-thirds of all territorial officials were polygamists. In 1867, 
Mormon leaders even petitioned Congress for the statute’s repeal, claiming 
that the absence of a single conviction demonstrated its inefficacy.394 A 
Congressional report conceded that the Morrill Act was a “dead letter,” but 
rather than abandon a federal law that had been stalled by resistance at the 
local level, Congress, as it did with Southern resistance, decided to redouble 
its efforts, beginning what Professor Sarah Gordon has called “a second re-
construction in the West.”395 
The federal government wanted to fight the battle over polygamy in hu-
manitarian terms. While formally claiming the power to regulate polygamy 
through the Territorial Clause,396 which authorized Congress to make 
“needful rules and regulations” in the territories, the government rested the 
heart of its case against the other “relic of barbarianism” on a similar right-
to-protection ground that justified much of its legislation concerning freed-
men in the South. When the Morrill Act’s constitutionality was argued in the 
Supreme Court in 1878, Attorney General Charles Devens, both in his brief 
and at oral argument, evaded explicit constitutional analysis of the federal 
power to outlaw polygamy, but he relentlessly emphasized the human cost 
of polygamy.397 The Morrill Act was about the federal government’s right 
to protect women from the bondage of polygamy. Only the prosecutions and 
convictions of polygamist men, the government contended, would safeguard 
the Utahn women from the abuse of the barbaric practice. 
Mormons, on the other hand, thought that the humanitarian issue was 
absurd. To them, polygamy not only was ordained by God but also was ac-
claimed by women. In 1870, only one year after the Wyoming Territory be-
came the first state or territory to grant women unrestricted suffrage, the 
Mormon-dominated Utah legislature enfranchised women in an attempt to 
illustrate both female support for polygamy and female liberty in Utah. In-
deed, women voters were such strong supporters of polygamy that Congress 
later disenfranchised them in the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887,398 one of 
many federal statutes passed in an attempt to end polygamy. Instead of hu-
manitarianism, Mormons thought the central issues were constitutional 
questions, chiefly concerning federalism but also concerning freedom of re-
ligion. Between 1862 and 1869, when the Supreme Court declared that the 
anti-polygamy legislation was constitutional, Mormons insisted that they 
had the constitutional right to structure their domestic relations like mar-
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riage however the Utahn majority saw fit.399 
The constitutional debate occurred in uncharted waters because the fed-
eral government had never before claimed the authority to pass laws regu-
lating marriage or religion. Rooted in federalism, the Mormons’ principal 
argument was that the Constitution protected local autonomy and local dif-
ferences against which the national Congress could not legislate. Although 
they conceded that the federal government had authority in the initial or-
ganization of the territories, they contended that such authority was limited 
to the basic questions of the structure of public government. Once the struc-
tures of territorial government were in place, they thought that domestic is-
sues were matters for local debate and disposition. Marriage laws always 
had been the province of the states, and it was difficult for the Mormons to 
see how local marriage practices affected the national interest. Quite simply, 
they did not believe that the Constitution granted Congress the authority to 
pass the Morrill Act.400 
Many Americans, particularly Southerners and Northern Democrats, 
agreed that local governments, even territorial governments, had the right to 
resist federal intervention in domestic matters that traditionally had been left 
to the states. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized precisely that principle 
only a few years before in Dred Scott, when the Court held that the Consti-
tution did not confer upon Congress general “powers over person and prop-
erty” but limited the federal government’s reach there as it did in the 
states.401 If the Territorial Clause did not grant Congress the power to regu-
late slavery in the territories, as the Court had found, then certainly Con-
gress could not regulate local marriages, an issue tied much less to the na-
tional interest. Nor had the recent amendments changed the equation. 
Although the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments reversed Dred Scott’s 
holding on black freedom, rights, and citizenship, they said nothing about 
expanding the federal government’s reach over marriages in the territories. 
Since Dred Scott, according to many Mormons, Southerners, and Northern 
Democrats, was still good law on the question of federal power in the terri-
tories, the Morrill Act was unconstitutional. 
In arguing the Mormons’ cause before the Supreme Court, George 
Washington Biddle, a prominent Philadelphia Democrat, relied chiefly upon 
this federalism question, going so far as to cite Dred Scott authoritatively. 
He claimed that a structural principle of the Constitution was the limitation 
of federal power to override the decisions of local majorities in areas tradi-
tionally reserved for local authority. The Morrill Act was facially unconsti-
tutional because the Territorial Clause conferred upon Congress the power 
to make only needful rules to protect the national interest, which did not in-
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clude marriage regulations. “There is always an excess of power,” he told 
the Justices,  
when any attempt is made by the Federal Legislature to provide for more than 
the assertion and preservation of the right of the General Government over a 
Territory, leaving necessarily the enactment of all laws relating to the social and 
domestic life of its inhabitants, as well as its internal police, to the people dwell-
ing in the Territory. 
The power to create a territory and to make needful regulations did not con-
fer upon the federal government the power to rule the inhabitants as “mere 
colonists, dependent upon the will” of the center. Like residents of the 
states, residents of the territories were “most competent to determine what 
was best for their interests.” They were protected in such self-determination 
by the “genius of the Constitution.”402 This was precisely what the Ameri-
can Revolution had been fought for and what the Constitution was designed 
to protect. Criminalizing polygamy constituted an abuse of power by the 
center against the periphery—an exercise of tyranny over the Utahns. 
Biddle also argued that the Morrill Act violated the First Amendment 
Free Exercise Clause403 because it prevented the Mormons from practicing 
a basic tenet of their religion. Although Biddle did not emphasize this argu-
ment, it became the core of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Reynolds v. 
United States,404 which was the Court’s first major decision on free exercise 
exemptions.405 Finding that Congress had the power to regulate polygamy 
because it was a social evil subject to government regulation, the Court held 
that the statute was constitutional because it regulated only action, not be-
lief, and thus did not violate the First Amendment.406 Although the Court’s 
decision was unanimous, modern scholars have noted that the post–New 
Deal Court has significantly qualified the ruling.407 The Mormons, in other 
words, had a plausible First Amendment argument as to why the Morrill Act 
was unconstitutional, and according to Reconstruction-era jurisprudence, 
their Territorial Clause argument was also plausible. Although even the 
Mormons ultimately agreed with the Court that their position was wrong,408 
the Morrill Act’s constitutionality was an open question at least until 1879. 
A decade before 1879, however, Republicans in Congress and in Utah 
were determined to eradicate polygamy by gaining control over the Utahn 
legal system, including the juries. With the completion of the transcontinen-
tal railroad at Promontory Summit, Utah, in 1869, increasing numbers of 
non-Mormon immigrants began settling in Utah. The Mormons, however, 
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still exercised absolute control over Utah’s legal apparatus, including its ju-
ries. The territorial legislature not only had severely limited the federal terri-
torial courts’ dockets by granting extensive criminal jurisdiction to the local 
probate courts, but it also had empowered local Mormon marshals, rather 
than federal officials, to summon jurors even for the federal courts.409 With 
Mormon-only juries, the federal government knew that it could not obtain 
any Morrill Act convictions. 
Republicans in the Forty-first Congress proposed a solution. In Decem-
ber 1869, Senator Aaron Cragin of New Hampshire introduced a bill “to 
provide for the execution of the law against the crime of polygamy” in 
Utah, which, among other changes to Utah’s legal system, would have made 
federal officials responsible for jury selection and denied the probate courts’ 
jurisdiction in criminal cases.410 More unusually, the bill provided: 
[N]o citizen of the United States, who is living in the practice of polygamy, or 
who believes in its rightfulness, shall be competent to serve as a grand or petit 
juror in criminal cases arising under the act of eighteen hundred and sixty two 
. . . or in criminal cases arising under this act.411 
Thus, Cragin wanted to purge from juries all citizens who just believed in 
polygamy’s legality, even if they did not practice polygamy themselves and 
even though the Morrill Act’s constitutionality would not be determined by 
the Supreme Court for another decade. He certainly thought that jurors had 
no right to decide questions of law—or even believe that an Act of Congress 
was unconstitutional—and thought that Congress was empowered to disal-
low nullification. 
  Two months later, Representative Shelby Cullom of Illinois introduced a 
corresponding House bill to take jury selection out of the Mormons’ hands 
and to increase the federal courts’ jurisdiction.412 Section 10 provided that 
“in all prosecutions for bigamy, and the crimes specified in this act, no per-
son shall be competent to serve, either as grand or petit jurors, who believes 
in, advocates, or practices bigamy, concubinage or polygamy.”413 This pro-
vision raised the ire of Utah’s non-voting delegate, William Henry Hooper, 
who said that even he, only a merchant by trade, understood that Section 10 
was a legal monstrosity “fraught with evil.” After recounting the signifi-
cance and history of criminal trial by jury, he asked: 
Now, sir, is there any member of this House who will claim or pretend that the 
provisions of this bill are not in violation of this most sacred feature in our Bill 
of Rights? The trial by jury by this bill is worse than abolished, for its form—a 
sickening farce—remains while its spirit is utterly gone. . . . The merest tyro in 
the law knows that the essence of a trial by jury consists in the fact that the ac-
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cused is tried by . . . a tribunal as will agree to no verdict except such as, sub-
stantially, the whole community would agree to if present and taking part in the 
trial. Any other system of trial by jury is a mockery and a farce. The standard of 
public morality varies greatly in a country so vast as ours, and the principle of a 
jury trial recognizes this fact, and wisely provides, in effect, that no person shall 
be punished who when brought to the bar of public opinion in the community 
where the alleged offense is committed is not adjudged to have been guilty of a 
crime.414 
Hooper thus made the classic argument for the jury’s right to decide ques-
tions of law. The jury was to act as the conscience of the community, and 
when the community agreed that a criminal statute was wrong, the jury was 
entitled to nullify and thus to acquit. 
  The House, however, rejected Hooper’s interpretation of the criminal 
jury right. Indeed, at least one leading Republican went so far as to repudi-
ate antebellum nullification in fugitive slave cases. After Representative 
Austin Blair of Michigan, who had been a prominent abolitionist, one of the 
most pro-Union Civil War governors, and was then a prominent proponent 
of women’s civil rights and suffrage, spoke entirely in favor of Cullom’s 
bill, Henry Dawes, a Moderate Republican from Massachusetts who sup-
ported the bill but opposed Section 10, questioned how Blair could support 
Section 10.415 Had they not belonged to a political organization that op-
posed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850? Were jurors in the prosecutions of the 
Fugitive Slave Act’s offenders not justified in nullifying? Blair responded: 
I must say to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Representative Dawes] that 
when I was engaged with him in an association which complained of the hard-
ships of the fugitive slave law and of its execution we complained because we 
wanted to defeat the law. We hated the law itself. I confess I would have tram-
pled it into the dust if I could have done it, I thought it was so inhuman. And for 
that purpose I was disposed to resort to every legal expedient that possibly could 
be availed of. But such was the law; and I believe I may now safely say that un-
der that law no jury ever found a verdict which the facts did not justify, assum-
ing that the law was one that should have been executed.416 
The great abolitionist and humanitarian Blair, who sought to abolish the 
death penalty, thus repudiated the abolitionists’ nullification legacy. Al-
though citizens were free “to resort to every legal expedient” to repeal un-
just laws, nullification was not a legal expedient. Jury verdicts were legiti-
mate only when the jury’s interpretation of the facts, not its interpretation of 
what the law should be, justified them. 
  In March, the House passed Cullom’s bill, including Section 10, by a 
94–32 vote.417 The House had been aware of Hooper’s Sixth Amendment 
objection that the Constitution protected nullification, debated whether nul-
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lification was the legitimate, and overwhelmingly interpreted the Constitu-
tion to permit it to disallow nullification. The House believed that it was 
constitutionally empowered to execute federal law at the expense of local 
juries’ rights. Indeed, if one takes the House’s humanitarian arguments seri-
ously, the congressmen may have believed that the women’s constitutional 
right to protection even required the House to disallow nullification. Like 
Cragin’s bill, however, Cullom’s bill died in the Senate without a vote at the 
hands of the powerful railroad lobby.418 Pro-railroad senators, like Califor-
nia’s Aaron Augustus Sargent, presumably wanted to minimize antagonism 
with the Mormon community. At any rate, they successfully advocated de-
lay, insisting that the newly completed railroad would bring “civilizing ele-
ments” to Utah that would make such legislation unnecessary.419 
  Meanwhile, the Grant Administration increased its efforts to suppress 
polygamy. In 1870, President Grant appointed new officials long associated 
with Republican opposition to polygamy who were determined to enforce 
the Morrill Act, including U.S. Attorney Charles Hempstead and Chief Jus-
tice James McKean. Chief Justice McKean wrote to President Grant that he 
had decided to recognize only the U.S. attorney and federal marshals as 
competent to try cases and to select juries. Through non-Mormon juries, 
Hempstead was able to indict Brigham Young and other church leaders for 
polygamy-related offenses.420 Their plan, however, did not work. In an un-
related civil case, the U.S. Supreme Court found that Chief Justice McKean 
had “wholly and purposely disregarded” the territorial statute directing the 
territorial marshal, not the federal marshal, to summon juries.421 The Court 
found that in the absence of a Congressional law to the contrary, the territo-
rial legislation had the authority to set forth rules for jury selection that fed-
erally appointed judges could not ignore.422 If the federal government did 
not like Utah’s jury system, only Congress could change it. The federal in-
dictments of Young and the other church leaders were quashed. 
  Besieged by pleas from Utah’s federal officials to amend the jury sys-
tem, President Grant called upon Congress to override the territorial legisla-
ture, explaining that without such an amendment “it will be futile to make 
any effort . . . for the punishment of polygamy, or any of its affiliated vices 
or crimes.”423 In May 1874, Representative Luke Poland of Vermont acted 
upon the request and proposed a bill to restrict the probate courts’ jurisdic-
tion and to reform the jury selection system. A former Vermont Supreme 
Court Justice, Poland had dealt with questions of jury nullification before. 
In an 1860 case, for example, a trial judge had instructed the jury that the 
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rule that the jury could decide questions of law appeared to him to be “a 
most nonsensical and absurd theory” but “such is the law of this State.”424 
The defendant objected that the judge was trying “to fly-blow the estab-
lished law of the state,” but Poland’s Supreme Court unanimously held that 
the instruction was not reversible error. The Chief Justice’s opinion stated 
that the rule that the jury is to determine the law may “be characterized as 
an absurdity,” but it “will nevertheless be sure in the long run to constantly 
gain ground, and become more and more firmly fixed in the hearts and 
sympathies of those with whom liberty and law are almost synonymous.”425 
  In 1874, however, Poland had less concern for jury rights. Although his 
bill was more moderate than Cullom’s had been in that it allowed a Mormon 
probate judge to draw half of the names for the jury lists, its Section 4 pro-
vided for the removal in any prosecution for adultery, bigamy, or polygamy 
of any juror who “practices polygamy or . . . believes in the rightfulness of 
the same.”426 Again, this provision received substantial attention in Con-
gress. Representative Lorenzo Crounse of Nebraska objected to Section 4 
because Congress’s “action upon this bill will become a precedent for the 
future.”427 Clarkson Potter, a Democrat from New York and future Presi-
dent of the American Bar Association, echoed similar concerns. He won-
dered whether “it would be better to drive this Mormon people out of the 
Territory without color of law at the point of the bayonet than to establish a 
precedent of this character.” Since he estimated that three-quarters of Utahn 
men were Mormons who believed in polygamy, he thought that “the Federal 
official would be able of his own will to pack a jury,” essentially destroying 
the jury trial right. “[M]y main objection,” he concluded, “is to . . . provi-
sion in the bill as reported that in all prosecutions for polygamy no man 
shall be a juror who believes in or practices polygamy.”428 
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  The Republican majority agreed that the central issue was jury nullifica-
tion. John Cessna of Pennsylvania reported that Mormons had told the 
House Judiciary Committee that it had not been “decided by the Supreme 
Court of the United States that the law against bigamy and polygamy in 
Utah was constitutional or otherwise, and that until it should be decided by 
the Supreme Court of the United States that the law was constitutional they 
would not obey it.”429 Instead of allowing local juries to decide whether the 
Morrill Act was constitutional, at least until the Supreme Court ruled on it, 
Cessna supported Poland’s bill. Jasper Ward of Illinois, another Judiciary 
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der?” he asked. “Do you allow a man to sit as a juror in a trial for any crime 
who believes in or commits that crime?” Ward insisted that “such a thing 
has not been heard” before.430 Ward, apparently, was not aware of jury nul-
lification in Alien and Sedition Act or Fugitive Slave Act cases. In any 
event, the House majority overwhelmingly thought Section 4 was constitu-
tional and passed Poland’s bill by a 159–55 vote.431 
  Once again, the Senate proved troublesome, and the railroad lobby 
stalled the measure.432 On the last day of the Congressional session, the Re-
publican majority decided to compromise. Senator Frelinghuysen offered to 
“prune the bill of anything that could be objectionable to any one who wants 
law there.”433 Senator Sargent, after repeating that “the progress of time, the 
influx of gentiles . . . is gradually solving this question,” moved to eliminate 
Section 4.434 Frelinghuysen had hoped to keep that provision, but he con-
ceded that if the opposition insisted on removing it, he would accept the 
amendment rather than see the bill fail; once amended, the bill passed.435 
The Senate sent the amended bill back to the House, where Poland admitted 
that a “great deal that was good in the bill has been struck out by the Sen-
ate.”436 Shortly before Congress adjourned, the House passed the amended 
bill, and upon President Grant’s signature, the Poland Act, with no provision 
for striking jurors based on belief alone, became law. 
  As soon as the Poland Act took effect, federal prosecutors began arrest-
ing Mormon leaders, including even George Cannon, Utah’s non-voting 
delegate in Congress. Convictions, however, remained rare because proving 
polygamy without marriage records or cooperating witnesses was difficult 
and because the juries remained half-Mormon.437 George Reynolds, whose 
case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1879, was convicted only after 
the federal government reneged on a deal and his second wife appeared 
visibly pregnant on the stand.438 Faced by a lack of convictions and with 
Supreme Court precedent on its side,439 Congress in 1882 passed the anti-
polygamy Edmunds Act, which included a provision excluding jurors who 
believed in polygamy from polygamy trials, like the one that had been re-
moved from Poland’s bill.440 By the time Utah achieved statehood in 1896, 
there were well more than a thousand polygamy-related prosecutions.441 
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  The Reconstruction Congresses’ crusade against polygamy demonstrates 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers not only saw jury nullification as 
outside the scope of Sixth Amendment protection but also viewed it as a 
practice that the government needed to eliminate to preserve the Utahn 
women’s right to protection from the “relic of barbarism.” According to 
many members of the Reconstruction Congresses, a prospective juror’s be-
lief that a law was unconstitutional, even if there were plausible constitu-
tional arguments in his favor, disqualified him from jury service. These 
members believed in nullification’s disallowance in spite of hearing objec-
tions that disqualifying jurors for mere belief violated the Constitution. Ju-
rors had no right to decide questions of law; in fact, if they did so, they dis-
qualified themselves. 
  Of course, Cragin’s and Cullom’s bills did not pass the Forty-first Con-
gress, and while the Forty-third Congress enacted the Poland Act, it was 
stripped of the juror-belief provision that would not become law until 1882. 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment’s fram-
ers overwhelmingly supported the anti-nullification legislation and under-
stood it as compatible with or required by the Constitution. First, the leaders 
of the anti-polygamy crusade—Cragin, Cullom, Frelinghuysen, Morrill, and 
Poland—all served in the Thirty-ninth Congress, and they were representa-
tive of the Republican ideology that existed from the antebellum era through 
Reconstruction. Second, the anti-nullification legislation, including the ju-
ror-belief provisions, was supported by strong majorities of the total Con-
gress. The House passed both Cullom’s bill and Poland’s original bill, in-
cluding Section 4, with 74% of the votes. Based on the evidence, it appears 
that the Senate let Cullom’s bill die and amended Poland’s bill only because 
the railroad lobby had enough influence to stall the bills, not because the 
Mormon pro-nullification legal position commanded a majority of the Sen-
ate votes. Neither bill, after all, was ever defeated in a vote, and Senator 
Sargent, who spearheaded the opposition, principally relied upon pragmatic 
arguments that polygamy would disappear of its own accord with the com-
ing of the railroad, not upon Delegate Hooper’s constitutional arguments 
that the House bills violated the Sixth Amendment. As a constitutional mat-
ter, the Reconstruction Congresses understood themselves to have the au-
thority to prohibit even “core” jury nullification. 
V. CONCLUSION 
  This paper has provided a descriptive and an interpretive account of jury 
nullification law during the Reconstruction Era. From the descriptive ac-
count, two conclusions follow. First, addressing a gap in the history of nine-
teenth-century jury nullification,442 this paper has showed that, on the 
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whole, the Reconstruction-era public understanding of jury nullification and 
the understanding in Congress were antithetical to the Founders’ under-
standing. What had been once considered a cherished right had been re-
duced to an unauthorized power at least a generation before Sparf. While 
Founding-era courts, treatises, and statesmen almost universally agreed that 
juries had the right to decide legal questions and thus to nullify the law, Re-
construction-era federal courts, treatises, and members of Congress, particu-
larly the Republican majority that framed the Fourteenth Amendment, un-
derstood juries to have the right to decide only questions of fact. 
  The second descriptive conclusion is that in reconstructing juries to in-
hibit jury nullification, Congress not only pursued a strategy of racial inte-
gration, as others have emphasized,443 but also took unprecedented steps to 
disqualify from jury service local majorities in the South and the West who 
would not enforce federal statutes through guilty verdicts. Particularly in 
Utah, many of those who the House in the early 1870s twice voted over-
whelmingly to disqualify (and who Congress in 1882 would disqualify) 
were nullifying based on what was then considered a plausible interpreta-
tion of constitutional law, akin to the type of “core” nullification lauded dur-
ing the Founding Era. The Reconstruction Congresses, in other words, were 
more interested in obtaining convictions to protect the civil rights of blacks 
and women than they were in making juries better reflect local communi-
ties. Indeed, some voices in Congress estimated that proposed Congres-
sional legislation to remove prospective nullifiers would disqualify 75–90% 
of previously eligible jurors.444 According to Congress, the mass disqualifi-
cations were constitutionally justifiable because juries were no longer the 
“conscience” of the community. Rather, juries were fact-finding instruments 
implemented not only to protect defendants’ constitutional rights but also to 
enforce victims’ civil rights. Only jurors who were willing to enforce fed-
eral law as instructed by the judge were qualified serve. 
  In addition to these descriptive conclusions, two interpretive conclusions 
also follow from the evidence. The first is that there is an originalist argu-
ment, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and history, for the cur-
rent doctrinal prohibition on jury nullification. With respect to state courts, 
the Reconstruction Congresses did not understand the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to protect directly the jury’s right to nullify or to incorporate the right 
against the states. The members’ statements and legislative proposals ac-
corded with the Reconstruction-era public understanding of the practice of 
jury nullification as expressed in treatises and dictionaries that defined nulli-
fication as just an unauthorized power and no longer a constitutional right. 
Therefore, regardless of a Founding-era Sixth Amendment federal right to 
nullify, no constitutional right to nullify, under originalist theory, should be 
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enforced in state courts. When courts apply the right to jury through the 
Fourteenth Amendment and give it “intelligible content,” they should, ac-
cording to this argument, apply the meaning of “jury” when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was framed and ratified, which excludes the right to nullify.  
  Moreover, with respect to federal courts, the Reconstruction Congresses’ 
understood themselves to be constitutionally authorized to disallow, or to 
codify the antebellum judiciary’s disallowance of, a Founding-era right to 
nullify. They pursued legislation that would purge from federal juries any 
prospective juror who believed that certain criminal statutes were unconsti-
tutional. This legislation was consistent with the text, history, and purposes 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the original Sixth Amendment had 
been designed to protect the citizenry through expansive jury rights from an 
overbearing government, the Fourteenth Amendment and its right to protec-
tion transformed the Constitution by elevating as rights protectors the fed-
eral judiciary over local juries and nationalism over localism. In transform-
ing the Constitution through a federally enforced right to protection of civil 
rights, the Fourteenth Amendment may thus have constitutionalized the 
nineteenth-century judicial precedent against nullification. 
  This argument suggests that even if the Supreme Court remains commit-
ted to originalism over doctrinalism in its constitutional criminal procedure 
jurisprudence, it need not overturn the precedents that prohibit nullification. 
The Court, under originalist jurisprudence, may have contemporary jury 
nullification doctrine correct after all—even if has yet to study its Recon-
struction-era history to understand why. An originalist Court may reaffirm 
its anti-nullification holdings while recasting them under a new rationale,445 
Reconstruction-era originalism, which better explains what the Fourteenth 
Amendment was understood to protect than the Court’s traditional Found-
ing-era originalism does. At a minimum, this alternative originalist account 
suggests that Founding-era history should not monopolize the original 
meaning of the post–Fourteenth Amendment Constitution. Given the Re-
construction-era transformation of constitutional law, including constitu-
tional criminal procedure, Reconstruction-era history matters in originalist 
interpretation; it too illuminates the Constitution’s original meaning. 
  From this follows this paper’s final interpretive conclusion. The con-
temporary Supreme Court may turn to originalism to give “intelligible con-
tent” to the criminal jury trial right, but originalism goes only so far. Ulti-
mately, the Court must use other methodologies to fill in the details. 
Originalism simply cannot provide the final answers. Indeed, at best, it may 
give the Court a menu of limited plausible interpretive possibilities from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  445  Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doc-
trine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 122–24 (2000) (discussing how in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
482–83 (1965), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holdings in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), while recasting them from a substantive due proc-
ess rationale to a First Amendment rationale).  
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which the Court must use another method to make a choice. 
  On the macro-level, we have seen that this is true in terms of Founding-
era versus Reconstruction-era originalism. With respect to jury nullification, 
Founding-era originalism posits that jury nullification is a constitutional 
right of defendants and juries inherent in Article III’s and the Sixth Amend-
ment’s right to jury trial. Reconstruction-era originalism, however, contends 
that nullification is an illegitimate practice that interferes with victims’ and 
potential victims’ constitutional right to protection. Originalism, in other 
words, may be deployed in multiple, contradictory ways, either, on the one 
hand, to protect defendants’ criminal procedure rights and localities’ rights 
or, on the other hand, to protect victims’ civil rights and government en-
forcement of those rights. Rights counteract rights. In selecting which 
originalist era to use and in determining to what extent new Fourteenth 
Amendment rights may revise and even abrogate earlier Sixth Amendment 
penumbral rights, originalist courts must choose one over the other. The cur-
rent Supreme Court has preferred the original Sixth Amendment rights, yet 
this paper has argued that prioritizing the Fourteenth Amendment rights is 
probably even more reasonable and originalist too. Originalism may provide 
these two plausible choices, but it cannot compel a particular choice. 
  On the micro-level, even Reconstruction-era originalism does no more 
than present a menu of plausible choices. It does overwhelmingly establish 
that the right to nullify was not understood to be incorporated against the 
states and that the disallowance of nullification was to some extent constitu-
tionalized for federal cases, as the KKK Act to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Cragin’s bill, Cullom’s bill, and Poland’s initial bill pro-
posed to purge from federal courts prospective nullifiers who would inter-
fere with victims’ civil rights. But to what extent were Sixth Amendment 
defendant and jury rights revised through Fourteenth Amendment victim 
and government rights? What was the scope of the constitutionalization of 
disallowance? There are at least three plausible choices: the Fourteenth 
Amendment disallowed the right of nullification first, in all cases; second, 
in cases in which the victims were “discrete and insular minorities”446; or 
third, in cases specified by Congress through its Section 5 authority. 
  One plausible reading of the evidence is that the Fourteenth Amendment 
disallowed the jury’s right to nullify in all cases. If nullification were disal-
lowed in all cases, then the implicit Fourteenth Amendment meaning of 
“jury,” under a last-in-time rule, would essentially supersede the earlier 
Sixth Amendment meaning of jury and transform or curtail the prior pen-
umbral Sixth Amendment rights. Reverse incorporation from the state cases’ 
non-incorporation principle or a similar “feedback effect”447 would produce 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  446  Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
  447  See AMAR, supra note 53, at 243 (discussing the Reconstruction-era “feedback effect” on the 
original Bill of Rights).   
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this result. This reading draws strength not only from principles of jurispru-
dential consistency but also from the victims’ rights-protecting theme of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its enforcement legislation, which emphasized 
that all potential victims had the right to be protected by deterrent criminal 
laws that were enforced by juries. It is also consistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s federalism theme, which prioritized Congress and the federal 
judiciary over localities and juries. This all-encompassing reading is also 
bolstered by Reconstruction-era jury law, as expressed in federal courts, 
state judicial trends, and legal treatises, which generally held that jury nulli-
fication was never a right in any case. It would mean that Sparf’s holding 
may be entirely consistent with originalism, if we use Reconstruction-era 
originalism, rather than Founding-era originalism, as the yardstick. 
  Another plausible reading of the evidence is that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, through the self-executing Section 1, disallowed the right to 
nullify only in cases where victims are discrete and insular minorities. Con-
fined to its historical context, the Fourteenth Amendment was about protect-
ing discrete and insular minorities, particularly freedmen and perhaps also 
Unionists and Republicans in the South whose rights had been violated be-
fore, during, and after the Civil War. The Reconstruction Congresses’ anti-
nullification legislation was similarly targeted. Although the proposed post–
Civil War treason trial legislation instructing jurors to decide cases “upon 
the evidence to be produced at trial” involved as a victim an entire nation 
injured by disloyalty, the more specific anti-nullification statutes explicitly 
protected victims that the Reconstruction Congresses considered minorities 
who were not being protected by local juries. In the case of the KKK Act, of 
course, the victims whose rights were being infringed were freedmen who 
were not even constitutionally guaranteed the right of jury service until the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875. Women victims in the polygamy legislation were 
discrete and insular minorities too. Although Utahn women comprised 
nearly half of the territory’s population and even held the right to vote, they 
did not have the right of jury service, and, more importantly, the Recon-
struction Congresses considered them a politically impotent minority en-
slaved by the “relic of barbarism.” Hence, the minority rights-protecting 
theme of Section 1 and the enforcement legislation makes the constitutional 
right to protection particularly compelling in the case of discrete and insular 
minorities, the paradigmatic Section 1 rights claimants. 
  A third plausible reading is that Congress must specify in its criminal 
statutes through its Section 5 authority when it is protecting victims’ Section 
1 rights by disallowing nullification. Although statutes ordinarily cannot 
trump constitutional rights, when Congress acts pursuant to express consti-
tutional authority to enforce other constitutional rights it may be engaging in 
a type of higher lawmaking. This reading Section 5 is also consistent with 
the legislation debated in the Reconstruction Congresses. Enacted through 
Congress’s Section 5 power, the KKK Act purged Southern nullifiers, but 
Congress specified only in KKK Act cases. Furthermore, although they 
were not Section 5 bills, the Cragin, Cullom, and Poland bills did the same  
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for Mormon nullifiers in polygamy and polygamy-related cases only. In 
other words, the Reconstruction Congresses did not pass legislation purging 
nullifiers from all federal cases but instead noted precisely in which types of 
civil rights cases judges should dismiss prospective jurors who were in-
clined not to decide cases on facts alone. Just as Congress instituted anti-
nullification provisions in the KKK Act to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it may be similarly able to implement anti-nullification principles in 
other criminal statutes designed to enforce the right of protection or other 
constitutional rights. 
These plausible readings illustrate that even if courts turn to Reconstruc-
tion-era orginalism, it cannot provide all of the answers as to what the sub-
stance of criminal procedure rights like trial by jury should be. Rather than 
providing conclusive solutions, Reconstruction-era originalism provides a 
framework through which the original meaning of constitutional rights may 
be understood. It serves as an alternative to the Founding-era originalism, 
like the arguments to restore nullification, that neglects the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s civil rights and federalism constitutional transformation and 
to nineteenth-century doctrine, like the judicial disallowance of nullifica-
tion, that lacks democratic warrant. Descending from among our greatest 
liberty-enhancing amendments, Reconstruction-era illuminates an under-
standing, but not the understanding, of our Constitution. 